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RESEARCH PROJECT: CRIME AND CULTURE

Crime as a Cultural Problem. The Relevance of Perceptions of Corruption to Crime Prevention. A Comparative Cultural Study in the EU-Accession States Bulgaria and Romania, the EU-Candidate States Turkey and Croatia and the EU-States Germany, Greece and United Kingdom

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RESEARCH REPORT GREECE:

**Perceptions of Corruption in Greece
A Content Analysis of Interviews from Politics, Judiciary, Police, Media,
Civil Society and Economy**

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Revision (draft 1)



1. Introduction

In the first phase we had to analyse either texts referring to corruption and ‘scandals’ or texts referring to the case studies (e.g. parliamentary proceedings, prosecutors’ findings, newspaper articles). In the second phase we had to analyse the discourse of the target groups been interviewed, in order to synthesise their views about the forms and the extent of corruption in modern Greece. Therefore, the comparison of the TG’s discourse between the first and the second phase was not always possible.

The main findings of the Greek research were briefly the following:

The word corruption was used very often in the texts, apart from judicial ones, as to be expected, adhered to legalese. Corruption was referred to as a *social illness* and occasionally as a *social phenomenon* and *by-product* of modern societies. Nevertheless, several texts shared a strong critical view of representatives of the state. This was more intense in the media, which promoted themselves as defenders of the public and guardians of public ethics. It also implies the increasing power of the Media in Greek society. However, it seemed that politicians were not affected by media’s criticism and considered themselves as the main group responsible and suitable for corruption control and treating of transparency in the social system.

According to the texts, Public Administration has received the strongest criticism, as being the basic impediment to transparency and therefore the development of the country. On the contrary, private economy was presented as the main ‘victim’ of corruption in Greece. The remaining groups shared a clear view of corruption. Justice promoted more legislation, the Police more control, Politicians want legislation, control and inspection mechanisms, while the Media whatever, as the case may be, and finally the NGO’s try to fit somewhere into the field. In general, the various target groups regarded the issue according to their requirements, roles and interests.

The word corruption is also used in political parties’ electoral programs in a dramatic and exaggerated way or a less emotive and more communicative. Only in one of these programmes the emphasis was put on interaction of private sector and parties’ financing. The overall conclusion was that according to the texts analysed, the official perceptions of corruption in Greece are not considerably different from the corresponding reports of international organisations.

During the second research period we carried out interviews with representatives from all six target groups. This phase was more demanding, since we have to share the views of our interviewees in order to interact in a successful discussion. The process of analysis and data generation were on technical terms the same with the first phase, yet, in the second analysis was much more challenging because of the rich material.

Firstly, we made a draft index with the ‘candidate’ interviewees, this was our primary sample; afterwards we started our contacts. In the meantime we prepared a formal cover letter for the interviewees, as well as a draft questionnaire with the main discussion points. Finally, we started the interviews, revising our contacts’ index from time to time.



2. Data Generation for the Analysis

2.1. Data Sources and Research Material

In Bucharest Project Meeting (February 2007), we presented two interviews carried out and analysed up to that time. These two interviews (ex-member of Transparency International Hellas Board [TG NGOs]¹ and a columnist of an Athenian newspaper [TG MEDIA]), were a good crash-test that helped us to revise and improve our questionnaire. Moreover, the given guidelines in Bucharest workshop proved to be very helpful to us.

The selection criteria for the interviewees were their position, their familiarity to the project's topic, their accessibility and the likelihood of a positive response. Personal acquaintance with some candidate interviewees was very helpful for the initial contact and their acceptance to be involved in the interview process. In all other cases, we found e-mail addresses or telephone numbers in order to contact them. Depending on their reaction – positive, negative or non response – we formed sub-samples for each Target Group. On the whole, negative response or no response was often and affected the progress of the second phase in a large scale. Many candidates were very reluctant to give us from their time or to talk about 'corruption'; additionally, they wanted to be sure about their anonymity and the goals of the research. To overcome this problem we had formulated a *cover letter*, as mentioned above, containing general information about the project and a draft *questionnaire* adjusted to each TG (and the interviewee) and corresponding to the guidelines at Bucharest's meeting (see details below).

After Konstanz meeting, we started the *main interview process*. The time until having a definite answer – positive or negative – was stressful and long. The willingness and interest of the target groups in giving an interview, with some exceptions, didn't increase even after the questionnaire and the cover letter which we sent to them. Sometimes a member of the group could spend a lot of time trying to reach a 'candidate' interviewee through phone calls, because if we were only sending an e-mail we may never get an answer. Some other times, we could not speak personally to the 'candidate' and we had to introduce ourselves and the project to many people before we could contact our reference person.

We faced serious difficulties establishing contacts, primarily with the target groups Justice, followed by Politics and Police for different reasons. Generally speaking, Justice is reluctant in giving any interview and participating in any research discussion, while politicians, especially the representatives of the government party are strongly protected by a firewall in contacting them.

Specifically, it was impossible to arrange an interview with two Union members of Justice despite our continuous efforts and to take an interview by the Prosecutors whose findings were analysed in the first phase of the project. Adding to the summer holidays and the pre-election period, several changes had to be carried out in the meeting schedule.

Our initial sample rose to 39 'candidate' interviewees. After our intensive efforts, we finally succeeded to arrange 24 interviews from 27 persons in total. Four persons participated in two interviews, two in each, and two interviews were carried out for one target group, in which participated three persons (2/1).

¹ TG: Target Group



- **TG POLITICS**

We intended to take interviews from all political parties, especially the two biggest ones – New Democracy (ND) and PASOK. However, we did not succeed to take a second interview by the governmental party (New Democracy), despite our persevering efforts.

New Democracy (ND): one interview with a MP (female).

Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK): three interviews with three MPs (one female) and one interview with a member of the party.

Left's Coalition (SYNASPISMOS): two interviews with two MPs.

Communist Party of Greece (KKE): one interview with a MP (female).

- **TG POLITICS - PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

General Inspector of Public Administration: one interview with the inspector himself.

- **TG JUSTICE**

As in the TG Police, personal acquaintances helped us very much to arrange an interview. Two interviews with high ranking judges.

- **TG POLICE**

Two interviews with three persons. The Service of Internal Affairs: one interview (two persons). The General Secretary of Pan-Hellenic Federation of Police Servants: one interview with one person.

Our fourth candidate (representative of another Police Union) refused.

- **TG MEDIA**

Three columnists of three daily newspapers of high circulation with long experience. One of them is the General Secretary of Editors' Association of Athens's Daily Newspapers.

- **TG CIVIL SOCIETY-NGOs**

In this case we succeeded to contact and interview with those NGOs whose documents were analysed in the first research period. Additionally with the President of an environmental NGO as there is a big movement in Greece in respect to such issues (Chamber for the Environment and Sustainability: one interview). Unfortunately the interview couldn't be transcribed due to technical problems.

The same applied with the interview with 'Paremvassi' - Citizens' Movement for Intervention: one interview by a board member. TI-Hellas: two interviews with the President and a board member and one interview with an ex-board member.

'Diktyo 21' - Network 21: one interview with the General Secretary.

'Kinisi Politon' - Citizens' Movement: one interview with the President and a board member.

- **TG ECONOMY**

We were successful in interviewing representatives of employees' as well as employers' union.

Hellenic Banks' Association (EET / HBA) one interview with the General Secretary.

Hellenic Federation of Industries / Enterprises (SEV / FGI) one interview with a member.

General Confederation of Greek Workers (and Employees) (GSEE): one interview with the Union President.



2.2. Comments on Data Generation

As referred above, the process until succeeding the approval of an interviewee to cooperate with us was arduous. This resulted in a serious delay in analysis and evaluation. Besides, we tried to bypass the impediments by ‘widening’ the criteria we had set in the beginning of the second phase (for example, the female quota, or the case studies of the first phase, etc.). Since corruption is a general and popular issue we made as many contacts as possible in order to increase the rate of positive answers, which finally rose to 56% of the initial sample and to only four (18,1%) women (three MPs, one police officer). Furthermore, despite the efforts of the group to make critical questions, some interviewees gave occasionally stereotypical and trivial answers (e.g. definition, reasons, forms), either because they wanted to avoid further questions, or – most possible – haven’t thoroughly thought about the issue.

Interviewing was carried out by two researchers each time and was recorded on tape. The duration of the interviews was approximately two hours. The transcription was quite time-consuming and sometimes it was difficult due to the bad quality of the recording, for example the noises around the place where the interview was taking place (e.g. in the cafeteria of the newspaper’s offices / building).

3. Methodology and Methods

At the end of July we decided to stop our attempts for arranging more interviews and started to analyse the data we have collected until then. We divided the data generation by target group and each member of the research team took up to two target groups to transcribe, analyse and write a draft with his/her remarks, notes and conclusions for reasons of coherent transcription and analysis. At this point we have to repeat the problem, with the Greek team faces with the transformation of the codes’ headers into *greeklish* in order to be compatible with the Atlas-ti software.

We decided to carry out a two-level analysis. The first was carried out by each group member: the codes, comments, etc. were written in Word, in order to facilitate the exchange of documents. This period was completed by the end of August. The second level analysis was carried out by the scientific coordinator, who revised the whole coding. This process was completed by the end of September. In the meantime we were transferring the documents with their codes, comments and memos into Atlas-ti. Finally, the group had a meeting where the structure of the final report was discussed.

3.1. Comments on the Structure of the Questionnaire

The instrument for the interviews was the questionnaire that the team had formulated and adjusted to the project guidelines. We avoided using the term ‘*corruption*’ in order not to reproduce its already wide use. We used instead terms such as *illegal practices*, *social issue or problem*, *offence*, *bribery*, *law violations*, *breach of duty*, etc. and left the reaction to the interviewee.

The questionnaire proved a useful and safe tool for the researcher. Nevertheless, in many cases the interviewees did not follow the questionnaire as they expressed their views in their own way.



The structure of the questionnaire was specified in four subject issues. The first one referred to the general anti-corruption legislation and the perceptions of the interviewees about it (EU and Greek). The second one accounted the definitions of corruption according to the views of the interviewees, to society's attitudes towards the problem, his/her view on its seriousness, its causes, the public discourse on the issue and the role of media. The third group of questions were target oriented coming from his/her own experience and the TG he/she belongs. The last group of questions was referring to policies and measures enforced or should be enforced against corruption, as well as their eventual success.

3.2. Coding, Codes, Memos

Our content analysis includes coding, comments and free memos. The coding procedure focused on (a) perceptions on relevant EU and Greek legislation, (b) definitions of corruption, (c) perceptions of the causes of corruption and (d) significance of the problem, (e) identification of the victims of corruption and (f) of the 'corrupt' attributed groups, as well as (g) concepts for confronting corruption. We used both *open coding* and *coding-in vivo* depending on the content of the interviewees' statement.

Comments were very useful because they were related to the codes, resulting in a better *in depth analysis*. Finally we used memos in order to write general thoughts concerning the interview. All these three ways of analysing were quite helpful in writing the report of the second phase.

4. Analysis

4.1. TG I POLITICS

4.1.1. General Comments

In the interviews of the Greek politicians who participated in our research the term, as well as the concept of corruption, is dealt with very different ways. The common broad elements for all political parties seem to be the role of the state and of profit seeking behaviour as significant characteristics of corruption². Nevertheless, each party uses, defines or approaches those elements differently.

All interviewees agree that corruption is a serious problem in Greece. What differentiates Greece from other (especially developed countries) is the widespread phenomenon of 'petty', 'everyday' corruption³. Some views support the idea that Greek society is 'pathogenic' as it is addicted to corruption due to lack of appropriate education, proper values and other historical reasons⁴.

Regarding the main causes of corruption and corrupt behaviour we could identify two lines of argument. The first line supports that the main cause of corruption is the lack of moral

² P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 3); P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODES 80-83; P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR: CODES 60, 61.

³ P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODES 10, 11 ; P23 TG POLITICS_PASOK GN: CODE 68.

⁴ P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODE 57 ; P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODES 99, 108, 109.



standards due to a series of reasons. Thus some interviewees give emphasis on individual responsibility and personal ethical values as the most important drive towards corrupt behaviour. This line of argument views corruption as an issue which is produced because of lack of personal responsibility and the associated moral commitment towards society. We can define this approach as ‘individualistic-ethicist’. The basic characteristics of this approach are in brief the following⁵:

- The main cause of corruption lies on individual values and behaviour.
- Moral standards and values are eroded because of the drop of educational standards and the quality of education, as well as because of the proliferation of a ‘regime of non punishment’.
- The basic solutions of the problem lies to the effort to alter personal ethical values through the educational system accompanied to the strengthening of institutional and law mechanisms against the phenomenon. The idea of ‘zero tolerance’ to corrupt behaviour at the individual level is strongly supported.

The second line of argument views corruption as a phenomenon with primarily systemic-structural characteristics. These refer either to the Greek socio-economic and political structure, development and history or to broader structures which are related to the functions of the global capitalist system. The basic characteristics of this approach are the following⁶:

- Corruption is produced dialectically through relations of individuals with institutions, socio-economic and political forces, as well as broader structures.
- Corruption lies inherently within the capitalist system of production and it is constantly produced and reproduced through market and commodity relations.
- Corruption is interpreted as the various specific relations between modern state and capitalist interests. Thus the definition of corruption adopted within this approach is a broad one and distinguishes between official, conventional definitions and interpretations, as for example petty corruption, from other forms of state-capital relations which are not characterized officially as corrupt (e.g. the activities of various lobbies, the role of off shore companies etc.).
- For this approach, personal values are related to broader dominant social norms such as for example individualism and commodification.
- Especially for Greece, this approach links corruption to the specific way of capitalist development through the proliferation of patron-client relations.
- The solutions according to this approach lie in greater state intervention in market relations and strong institutions building.

It is worth mentioning, that one interviewee linked corruption in Greece and other less developed countries of Europe, with the notion and process of ‘primary accumulation’⁷. There is a vast international bibliography about ‘primary or primitive accumulation’ and it is not our intention to analyze it here in depth. Primary accumulation is considered to be a stage of development of capitalist relations of production which in many circumstances entail violent and ‘corrupt’ ways of appropriation of value and income (for example theft, deceit, use of position power to extract value etc.) which later on is converted into capital. All capitalist

⁵ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODES 2, 3, 5, 59, 65, 108, 109; P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODES 57, 59 ; P23 TG POLITICS_PASOK GN: CODES 67, 73.

⁶ P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR: CODES 28-31, 50-52, 57-60, 77, 80, 81, 95-97; P16 POLITICS_KKE_NIB: CODES 13-15, 30-32, 114, 116; P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODES 15-24, 31, 51-52, 210-215, 227.

⁷ P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR: CODES 55, 56.



countries, from the oldest (for example UK) to the newest (for example Russia) passed through the stage of primary accumulation. This is why high level of some forms of corruption in modern-days characterizes the less or the least developed countries of the world. According to this way of thinking, corruption is not an 'anomaly' caused by immoral state bureaucrats but an unavoidable stage of capitalist evolution and a stable characteristic of latecomers to the capitalist mode of production.

In respect to other ideas expressed by the interviewees, the obstacles that the citizens meet because of bureaucracy are an alibi for them to justify their activity, thus there should be more strict law enforcement towards the citizen as well.

The vast majority of interviewees, and especially those affiliated with the two largest parties, aim to defend the political system and to pass the main responsibility of corruption to other target groups, such as the media, justice and NGOs.

On account of media, and according to the dominant line of discourse in our interviews with politicians, they usually over inform and in many cases cause disillusionment to the public, without contributing in the overall debate in a substantial and effective way. Their discourse aims to impress as well as to reproduce 'everyday theories'. Some interviewees point out that many media operate illegally and sometimes they either enforce corruption or are the centre of corruption themselves. Moreover, they stress that media's use of 'corruption', as well as the place of the issue in their agenda is characterized by overstatement and it is one of the most important reasons for the spreading of the '*culture of corruption*' in the public and society. This culture means that citizens view corruption as a normal way of getting things done and that this way of thinking and practice is becoming deeply embedded into the conceptual, moral and practical attitudes of everyday life. Therefore it is extremely difficult to mitigate the phenomenon.

In relation to the role of the judicial system, some interviewees expressed the opinion according to which it is manipulated by the government and thus it is impossible to play a key role in the fight against it.

Similar concerns are expressed by some of the interviewees, about the independence of NGOs as they are funded by the state and their ability or will to become a major actor for mitigating such practices are limited. Almost all interviewees acknowledge that there is limited or no political desire in order to eliminate corruption. This belief contradicts in a certain extent with the 'individualistic-ethicist' discourses as it underlines a structural element of the reproduction of corruption and notably to the unwillingness of the political system to fight it effectively.

It is strongly supported that there are no positive outcomes from corruption because the system operates through dysfunction. Corruption is harmful for the state and for the citizen in the long-term ('*Zero tolerance to corruption*').

Finally the two big parties (PASOK and ND) are quite optimistic for the future, whereas the other two are pessimistic and believe that corruption will never be eliminated under the present socio-economic system and structures.



4.1.2. Evaluation Units

P16 TG POLITICS_KKE_NIB
P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK
P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP
P19 TG POLITICS_PASOK_CL
P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR
P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK
P23 TG POLITICS_PASOK_GN
P24 TG POLITICS_PASOK_PASV

4.1.3. Interviews' Analysis

PASOK (PANHELLENIC SOCIALIST PARTY)

We carried out four interviews with MPs from PASOK. Concerning the definition of corruption there was a variation in interpretations and concepts. Each interviewer described 'corruption' in his/her own terms. One definition is related to persons who are connected to the state and exploit this connection in order to gain illegal profit for themselves or for someone else, at the expense of the system which is supposed to serve⁸. It reflects the legal definition of Greek Criminal Law on 'corruption' which has to do with offences on duty⁹.

A different view states that the term 'corruption' is strongly related to the Greek social reality, exaggerates and brought the structures on disrepute¹⁰, although exaggeration is left vague. 'Corruption' in Greece is not only political, economic or social, whereas it is 'multifarious'¹¹ and it is related with the state mechanisms. 'Corruption' is embedded in the system¹². This standpoint entails the idea that corruption is a structural phenomenon, closely related to the means the state operates in Greece.

An aspect of corruption that it is obvious in all interviews is the moral one. Corruption is a strong moral issue¹³ and consequently an unethical law violation¹⁴. When the interviewees refer to the 'corruption' of politicians, this becomes a matter of *ethos* and the *quality* of the person's character¹⁵. As a result they all try to defend the political system and the politicians in particular by intensively asserting that not all of them are 'corrupt'. The majority of the politicians are honest, 'sterling'¹⁶ and they are just doing their job, but there is a whole system around them who is corrupt and has profits, not politicians themselves¹⁷. They emphasize that

⁸ P23 TG POLITICS_PASOK_GN: CODE 7.

⁹ P23 TG POLITICS_PASOK_GN: CODE 8.

¹⁰ P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODES 2, 3.

¹¹ P24 TG POLITICS_PASOK_PASV: CODE 65.

¹² P24 TG POLITICS_PASOK_PASV: CODE 53.

¹³ P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODE 30.

¹⁴ P23 TG POLITICS_PASOK_GN: CODE 70.

¹⁵ P19 TG POLITICS_PASOK_CL: CODE 24; P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODE 13.

¹⁶ P24 TG POLITICS_PASOK_PASV: CODE 49.

¹⁷ P24 TG POLITICS_PASOK_PASV: CODES 48, 50.



the less corrupt institution in Greek society is the Parliament¹⁸, and assert that political corruption is only one of its various aspects¹⁹.

All PASOK representatives stand at the same position that ‘corruption’ is not only a ‘Greek’ phenomenon but a global one, giving examples of relevant cases in Europe and USA²⁰. Since corruption is extended, they see the thorough discussion in recent years absolutely justified²¹. Corruption is evident in the economic transactions which result in long-term profit²². They account corruption of party financing as the outcome of the voting system and the corresponding law. Law is inadequate, inefficient and rather only for show off²³. The MPs are forced by the law to look for other sources of funding as the money that the state grants them for this purpose is not enough: in this context they repeat that ‘*Democracy costs*’²⁴. They believe that the voting system law should change because the smaller electoral constituency, the less the dependency of MPs on entrepreneurs for financing²⁵. They also refer to Local Government, a service where corruption is ‘visible’. They accuse it of irresponsibility and wire-pulling practices²⁶. They also refer to examples of ‘petty corruption’ and believe that this form is the most worrying because it emerges the ‘pathogen’ of Greek society²⁷.

Their attitudes towards media are discrediting. They reject the discourse which the media use about corruption. They characterize it as inane²⁸, they assert that corruption is media’s favourite subject and the discussion is just for the impressions²⁹. They also underlined that the media are the ‘*most corrupt institution of the country*’ and ‘*the bigger their businesses the more the products of corruption*’³⁰. For them corruption in media is bigger than corruption in politics³¹.

Although most of the interviewees appreciate EU’s efforts to control the problem, they are sceptical about its efficiency, as it cannot operate as a prototype because cases of corruption in its administration and leadership have been occasionally came to light³².

All the interviewers noticed to complicated legislation as one of the most important factors for corruption³³. In addition, culture, education and social awareness are reckoned equally crucial

¹⁸ P23 TG POLITICS_PASOK_GN: CODE 184.

¹⁹ P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODE 11.

²⁰ P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODE 4.

²¹ P23 TG POLITICS_PASOK_GN: CODE 3.

²² P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODE 4.

²³ P23 TG POLITICS_PASOK_GN: CODE 137.

²⁴ P19 TG POLITICS_PASOK_CL: CODE 42.

²⁵ P24 TG POLITICS_PASOK_PASV: CODE 36.

²⁶ P23 TG POLITICS_PASOK_GN: CODE 186.

²⁷ P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODE 33.

²⁸ P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODE 49.

²⁹ P24 TG POLITICS_PASOK_PASV: CODE 81.

³⁰ P24 TG POLITICS_PASOK_PASV: CODES 84, 85.

³¹ P23 TG POLITICS_PASOK_NIOTIS: CODE 96.

³² P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODES 21, 22; P TG POLITICS_PASOK_CL: CODE 57.

³³ P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODE 18.



for the development of the phenomenon³⁴. Finally, the erosion of the value system³⁵ and that personal interest comes before the collective one contributes also to political corruption³⁶.

It is generally accepted that in order to restrict corruption, radical measures are needed³⁷, often characterized as ‘revolution’³⁸. Apart from prevention³⁹ they promote tougher legislation and more severe sentences because the phenomenon so far has been dealt with carelessness and tolerance⁴⁰.

ND (NEW DEMOCRACY - NEA DIMOKRATIA)

We carried out only one interview with the governmental party. Corruption is defined as a damaging situation for the morals, which tends to occupy a dominant position in society⁴¹. The interviewee refers to corruption as closely related to disregard and rejection of the social and individual value system of modern societies⁴². This is the reason why in the interview the words ‘morals’ and ‘values’ were repeated.

The responsibility is put on both sides, not only on the person who accepts the bribe⁴³. It is an exchange in which two people take part. The interviewee was swinging between the individual responsibility⁴⁴ and the responsibility of the ‘system’, as well as the state. Finally she decided for the responsibility of the individual, because the citizen does not only react but reproduces it by participating.

For the representative of ND media favour corruption for they sponsor the easy profit and moral lenience⁴⁵. Their discourse on corruption is meaningless as they themselves operate out of the law⁴⁶ (she refers to the licences for operating private radio stations and television channels). Media do not inform but scandalize, they create issues, overstate and distort the reality⁴⁷, ‘turning facts upside down’. Corruption is multi-factorial and media make the most of it in order to answer their own interests⁴⁸.

³⁴ P23 TG POLITICS_PASOK_GN: CODES 52, 53, 147.

³⁵ P24 TG POLITICS_PASOK_PASV: CODE 16.

³⁶ P24 TG POLITICS_PASOK_PASV: CODE 37.

³⁷ P24 TG POLITICS_PASOK_PASV: CODE 61.

³⁸ P18 TG POLITICS_PASOK_MAP: CODE 44.

³⁹ P23 TG POLITICS_PASOK_GN: CODE18.

⁴⁰ P23 TG POLITICS_PASOK_GN: CODES 20, 21.

⁴¹ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODE 3.

⁴² P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODE 5.

⁴³ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODE 14.

⁴⁴ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODE 15.

⁴⁵ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODES 26, 27.

⁴⁶ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODES 29, 30.

⁴⁷ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODES 31, 32, 33.

⁴⁸ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODES 34, 35.



Concerning party financing the interviewee supports state funding and to be in public in order to be really independent⁴⁹. Corruption can be fought only by common efforts⁵⁰. For ND representative⁵¹ one serious reason for corruption is the complex legislation and inadequate law enforcement; the last was regularly stressed in this target group.

EU is insufficient, enforces corruption⁵² and its bureaucratic structure cannot operate as a good example⁵³. Change in the mentality with an educational campaign in the society⁵⁴ is necessary as well. According to the interviewee, all these policy measures must be carried out, otherwise *'we are going to be drawn into corruption'*⁵⁵. Finally, society is addicted to corruption and in relation to the past people is more tolerant to deceit⁵⁶.

KKE (COMMUNIST PARTY OF GREECE)

We interviewed only one MP from the Communist Party of Greece. KKE has a different approach to corruption in relation with the other two parties. First of all corruption is a 'political issue'⁵⁷ and a newsreel. Thus, the communist Party is opposed to the common definition of corruption as for them it is the exploitation of the employees and the structures of the existent capitalist system that produces corruption⁵⁸. The interviewee underlines that although the discussion on corruption is very rich, there is no considerable success against it⁵⁹.

One of the main factors of corruption is the structure of the political system and particularly capitalism along with the free competition⁶⁰.

Petty corruption (e.g. bribery in order to speed up the administrative procedures) is not an issue of serious concern⁶¹ for the representative of KKE. Grand corruption instead is the issue, remaining outside the possibilities of law enforcement and state control. Privatisation⁶² of education system, of national health system etc., as well as commissions in public works are examples of real, 'organised' corruption⁶³. Moreover, the new electoral law described as 'robbery of votes'⁶⁴ is another case of 'legal' corruption.

⁴⁹ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODE 39, 40.

⁵⁰ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODE 56, 57.

⁵¹ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODE 58.

⁵² P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODE 73.

⁵³ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODE 74.

⁵⁴ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODES 79, 80.

⁵⁵ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODE 86.

⁵⁶ P17 TG POLITICS_ND_PAPK: CODES 88, 89.

⁵⁷ P16 TG POLITICS_KKE_NIB: CODE 1.

⁵⁸ P16 TG POLITICS_KKE_NIB: CODES 10, 11, 13.

⁵⁹ P16 TG POLITICS_KKE_NIB: CODE 29.

⁶⁰ P16 TG POLITICS_KKE_NIB: CODE 114.

⁶¹ P16 TG POLITICS_KKE_NIB: CODE 38.

⁶² P16 TG POLITICS_KKE_NIB: CODE 56.

⁶³ P16 TG POLITICS_KKE_NIB: CODE 39.

⁶⁴ P16 TG POLITICS_KKE_NIB: CODE 63.



The media for their own good reasons promote the view and reproduce in public opinion the feeling that *'everybody is a crook, everybody steals'*⁶⁵, discrediting political life.

The interviewee shows also reservations about the NGOs; *'they are not so innocent stories'*, because they are not only funded by the governments but also from foreign power centres⁶⁶.

In general, the interviewee sounds very pessimistic. Corruption rises and although legislation exists, it cannot fight the erosion of citizens' conscience⁶⁷. Therefore the education of society reckoned for the time-being the most important way to confront corruption⁶⁸.

SYNASPISMOS (LEFT'S COALITION)

The two interviewees of Left's Coalition are together with the interviewee of the Greek Communist Party the main representatives having a compact approach to corruption with some differentiations in their analysis, eventually because of their different background; one is jurist the other one is economist. The one attributes corruption to economic mechanisms influencing society through the political system, the other one to the structure of political system⁶⁹, the clientelism⁷⁰, collusion of economic with political interests and submission of political system to the first. Corruption follows the defilement of legislative power and parliamentary control by party-political patronage over the MPs,⁷¹ as well as over the public administration, which turns to serve the interests of governmental party, and thus, its public (service's) role is being decayed⁷².

Both interviewees refer to commercialisation of politics and public goods. In somehow similar context with KKE, the interviewees agree that public rights are granted by the governments to the private sector for retaining party-political support⁷³. Hence, public goods revert from rights to commodities and to objects for negotiation and exchange⁷⁴. According to them, corruption evolves mainly in the interface between public and private sector (see also TG NGOs). Private sector is criticized so much as politics, for producing corrupt practices, since most Greek companies are not competitive but rely on public procurement. Political corruption is explained by synchronising of interests between politics and private enterprises⁷⁵.

Corruption is also related to overregulation⁷⁶, such as the taxation system⁷⁷ which results in a 'corruption greenhouse'⁷⁸. Moreover, to the missing political will to tackle corruption⁷⁹ and

⁶⁵ P16 TG POLITICS_KKE_NIB: CODE 75.

⁶⁶ P16 TG POLITICS_KKE_NIB: CODE 50.

⁶⁷ P16 TG POLITICS_KKE_NIB: CODE 110.

⁶⁸ P16 TG POLITICS_KKE_NIB: CODE 113.

⁶⁹ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 3.

⁷⁰ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 3.

⁷¹ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 14.

⁷² P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODES 18, 22.

⁷³ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 52.

⁷⁴ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODES 15, 52.

⁷⁵ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODES 209-213.

⁷⁶ P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR: CODE 48.



consequently ‘corruption guffaws’⁸⁰. Structural corruption becomes a regime⁸¹, whose mechanisms make the citizens to be dependent to bribery⁸² as if there would be no other way⁸³.

The overstatement of mass media to corruption makes citizens habituated to it, reproduces complicity, values’ erosion, while the real issue and their role is obfuscated⁸⁴. It results in the enhancement of distrust and disillusionment with democracy itself, and all its institutions⁸⁵.

Justice is unqualified and powerless for investigating such interests, so the political and economical system uses it as ‘Siloam pool’⁸⁶, for legitimating their decisions and preferences. Thus, it plays in turn indirectly the game of the political system. In the same position are the control authorities, lacking in power and efficiency.

Although NGOs can play a significant role and are generally appreciated for having the potentiality to organise and give voice to civil society⁸⁷, they are usually either ‘governmental armies’⁸⁸ or ‘mouthpieces of extra-institutional centres’.⁸⁹

Finally, for confronting corruption the main forms approved are the strengthening and support of democratic institutions, while the need for larger socioeconomic changes is rather downplayed⁹⁰.

According to the interviewees, corruption is an international phenomenon⁹¹ associating with the globalisation⁹² of economical interests, the modern competitive economic system⁹³, cyber-economy⁹⁴ and promiscuous operation of stock market⁹⁵. The strong interest of EU derives from these developments and the following risks democracy stop being the governance model. This is an interesting difference between the two left parties, whereby KKE shows its scorn and Synaspismos its (critical) support⁹⁶, since they note that EU also, suffers from corruption⁹⁷. Furthermore, there are some reservations on the effects of OECD’s ranking,

⁷⁷ P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR: CODE 54.

⁷⁸ P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR: CODE 49; P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 114.

⁷⁹ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 184.

⁸⁰ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 206.

⁸¹ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 232.

⁸² P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR CODE: 59.

⁸³ P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR CODE: 63.

⁸⁴ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 65.

⁸⁵ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODES 120-124.

⁸⁶ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 182.

⁸⁷ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 198.

⁸⁸ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 196.

⁸⁹ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODES 199-202.

⁹⁰ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 80.

⁹¹ P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR: CODE 3.

⁹² P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR: CODE 26.

⁹³ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 10.

⁹⁴ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 31.

⁹⁵ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 246.

⁹⁶ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 173.

⁹⁷ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODES 88, 173; P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR: CODES 41, 42.



because they create positive or negative view towards a country⁹⁸; especially for Greece it is justified not because of the extend of corruption but because the country does not correspond to basic obligations to transparency.

Another interesting difference is the one with the police, which identify corruption with organised crime, eventually because it is a challenging form of illegal activities in the corps. For our interview of Synaspismos, the legalisation of corruption proceeds uses the same ways, methods and techniques followed by the organised criminal networks, thus corruption transcends established national boundaries and is reproduced worldwide⁹⁹.

From the one side, the term corruption is regarded wider than in criminal law (same with KKE) in terms of social, entrepreneurial, and media ethics; furthermore justice is considered social justice, in terms of 'redistribution of wealth' (see also TG Mass Media), taxation justice and decrease of regional inequalities. From the other side, corruption exists only if coercion is exercised¹⁰⁰; therefore, corruption is not only related with money, but also with compromise to pressure¹⁰¹.

4.2. TG I POLITICS-PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

4.2.1. General Comments

Our meeting with the office of GIPA, as well as himself, was easily approved and welcomed. His feelings about the situation in PA were painted with dark colours. He expresses his views rather free being protected by his extended institutional authority and independence.

4.2.2. Evaluation Units

P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA

4.2.3. Interview's Analysis

The General Inspector stresses that corruption is not only a Greek issue but a global one which needs the international cooperation¹⁰² in order to be confronted¹⁰³. Generally, EU, international cooperation and joint actions for the reduction of corruption rates are accounted having positive effects for Greece's mobilization¹⁰⁴. Especially the country's participation in GRECO motivated the Greek Parliament for institutional reforms (Law 3074/2002) in order

⁹⁸ P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR: CODE 34.

⁹⁹ P21 TG POLITICS_SYN_NK: CODE 166, 176, 179.

¹⁰⁰ P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR: CODES 13, 14.

¹⁰¹ P20 TG POLITICS_SYN_MDR: CODES 18, 22.

¹⁰² P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 4.

¹⁰³ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 5, 6.

¹⁰⁴ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 14, 26, 40, 41.



to promote transparency¹⁰⁵, such as the Office of General Inspector of Public Administration¹⁰⁶. However, the General Inspector questions *Corruption Perception Indexes*¹⁰⁷ of Transparency International and the consequent countries' ranking because they are based on perceptions of the interviewees and not on hard facts¹⁰⁸. In this way the General Inspector justifies the peculiarities of the 'Greek case'¹⁰⁹. Nevertheless the peculiarities remain undefined. He notes also, that EU policies give more emphasis on 'grand' than on 'petty corruption' which remains a local problem¹¹⁰.

The General Inspector refers to the difficulties of his Office due to 1) failing data, 2) reluctance (direct or indirect) of Public Administration to conform to the recommendations of the General Inspector, 3) the numerous control mechanisms which his Office can not overview¹¹¹.

The working term for the General Inspector is that of the World Bank (abuse of public power for private benefit). He uses this definition as an 'umbrella' which incorporates some of its derivatives (opacity, synchronizing of interests etc.)¹¹². Based on this definition he argues that this kind of corruption can only be seen in Public Administration¹¹³ and not to the private sector¹¹⁴.

According to the General Inspector the extent of corruption in Greece and its social tolerance is high. This situation is explained with the overused argument of socialization and historical residues from the Ottoman occupation¹¹⁵, but mainly to the collapse of traditional values¹¹⁶ and social attitudes due to the consumerism¹¹⁷ promoted by the private TV¹¹⁸. A change was taken place in the social structure¹¹⁹ and the only stable value of social behaviour is now money ('only money counts')¹²⁰. Related to that, the General Inspector concerns about the expansion of corruption, because it produces an unknown social situation to some decades ago.

We can see a clear distinction between high level (national government) and low level (local government) politics when the General Inspector distinguishes corrupt practices of MPs and the local government. Although the General Inspector referred once to grand corruption and

¹⁰⁵ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 42.

¹⁰⁶ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 7-9.

¹⁰⁷ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 45.

¹⁰⁸ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 46, 47.

¹⁰⁹ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 43, 44.

¹¹⁰ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 28.

¹¹¹ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 33-35, 37, 38, 181.

¹¹² P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 83-85.

¹¹³ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 88, 89.

¹¹⁴ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 87.

¹¹⁵ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 95.

¹¹⁶ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 98.

¹¹⁷ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 101-104, 106.

¹¹⁸ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 98, 174.

¹¹⁹ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 99.

¹²⁰ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 101.



criticized the governments for their strategies against corruption as insufficient if not hypocritical¹²¹, his main criticism is on the servants of local authorities. For him local administration along with the trade unionism and mass media are the three ‘wounds’ of the modern Greek society¹²². Furthermore the lack of moral standards¹²³ for serving citizens’ interests in local communities is a unique development of the last decades. The reliance of local authorities on the communities and clientism are the main reasons for corrupt practices and exchanges in local administration¹²⁴.

For the General Inspector, public administration is a closed system having its own rules and codes (slow, highly bureaucratic)¹²⁵. Corruption takes place mainly in lower ranges of public administration and only¹²⁶ in services where is (big) money (‘where is money, is also corruption’)¹²⁷. For him there is a ‘critical percentage’, which if the service jumps, then corruption is an issue of concern in the service¹²⁸. What is the critical percentage still is not defined.

Three main factors produce corruption in Public Administration. The first is administration’s reliance on governments and party politics¹²⁹, the second is money transactions between citizens and public services¹³⁰ and the third is overregulation, complex legislation, as well as ambiguities in legislation, contradiction in terms and content of legislation (‘grey zone’) offering high discretionary power to public administration.

He suggests 1) regulatory reform (recasting¹³¹, consolidation of legislation¹³², simplification¹³³), as well as 2) administrative reform: simplification of procedures and full computerization in order to avoid ‘contacts points’ between citizens and public servants¹³⁴. Yet, he notes that none of the measures will be effective if the involvement of politics in public administration will continue¹³⁵.

Finally, the General Inspector expresses a rather optimistic view for the future¹³⁶, unlike to his initial criticism to Greek society in general and public administration is specific. Moreover, despite his previous criticism to politicians, he admits the support of the government on his Office, a rather diplomatic answer in favour of his own image and service.

¹²¹ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 118, 123, 125-127, 130, 13.

¹²² P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 146.

¹²³ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 148.

¹²⁴ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 151.

¹²⁵ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 187.

¹²⁶ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 132, 133, 161.

¹²⁷ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 186, 138.

¹²⁸ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 134.

¹²⁹ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 159, 169.

¹³⁰ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 135.

¹³¹ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 141.

¹³² P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 152.

¹³³ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 165.

¹³⁴ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 163.

¹³⁵ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 178.

¹³⁶ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 170.



4.3. TG II JUSTICE

4.3.1. General Comments

Justice in general and prosecutorial service in specific is a strict hierarchal organisation. Judges and prosecutors are very rarely presented in the media giving interviews or making statements, unless this is granted by the head of their office in the district and for a special reason.

The Public Prosecution Service is independent of the judicial authority and the executive (Article 24, Law 1756/1988, Article 6 par. 3, Law 1868/1989). The Service operates in a 'unified and indivisible way'. This means that the Prosecutor does not represent him/herself, but the whole authority. The head of the service is the general public prosecutor (public prosecutor of the Supreme Court). Admission to the public prosecution service as well as to Justice is achieved through examinations and graduation from the National School of Judges. Initially we attempted to contact the First Instance Prosecutors engaged in our case studies of the previous research phase. Being unsuccessful, we applied for an interview with the Head of the Athenian Prosecutorial service to which he finally denied. Afterwards we tried to contact two members of the administrative council of the Judges' and Prosecutors' Union again without success. Finally, an interview was granted by the General Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation with a Vice Prosecutor of the same Court. The second interview proved relative easy because of personal acquaintance. The interviewee is Judge of the Council of State.

The third one is the General Inspector of Public Administration, who is emeritus judge of the Court of Appeal. We found out that several of his reference points and views fit in the analysis of justice. So, a part of our discussion is adjusted to the presentation of target group – Justice.

4.3.2. Evaluation Units

P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K
P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D
P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA

4.3.3. Interviews' Analysis

The first two judges have a distant and moderate approach to the issue of corruption. When they speak, they use few adjectives (mostly *low*), more verbs and nouns. Both refer to the point without exaggerating. The term corruption is regarded as general¹³⁷ and not adequate to describe a crime¹³⁸. Although one of them initially characterises the term as useful for the communication, after a while notes that it is *general* and *broad* and later *very broad*¹³⁹, becoming sceptical with the time. The other one notes that the term offers the opportunity for

¹³⁷ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODE 4.

¹³⁸ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 6,19.

¹³⁹ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODE 16.



moralising¹⁴⁰, since this element is inherent in it. The third one declares that he accepts the World Bank definition¹⁴¹, and pinpoints that corruption is the ground of illegal activities, relating it with the moral standards of each person¹⁴². Corruption for him contains bribery, breach of duty, of trust, tax evasion etc.¹⁴³ remaining open for other crimes to be included.

Corruption is reckoned a global phenomenon not only a Greek problem, existed always and everywhere¹⁴⁴ and in the whole social stratification¹⁴⁵. Moreover, it is not considered identical with deviance¹⁴⁶. It is differentiated in corruption for legal and corruption for illegal activities¹⁴⁷. The first one – for legal activities, whereby its process is illegitimate but the product is legal – is not regarded as having special side effects for the society¹⁴⁸, though it is rejected¹⁴⁹; the second one has serious negative consequences, not so much because illegal activities are committed, but because they undermine society's trust to the political system, public administration and justice¹⁵⁰. The interviewees stress that corruption is economical in its core¹⁵¹.

The third one disputes the reliability of CPIs¹⁵²; according to him, Greeks generally exaggerate¹⁵³, they overemphasize mainly the negative and unfavourable, harming themselves (cf. TG Politics). Perceptions and attitudes are not estimated of reliable measures for corruption; instead statistics and specifically research in court decisions, decisions of disciplinary councils and of judicial councils would bring more reliable data¹⁵⁴. This approach is also repeated several times by another interviewee of the present target group¹⁵⁵.

Concerning the reasons of corruption two main aspects are formulated, 1) of a macro-level having two versions (socio-legal and eclectic-value oriented) and 2) a micro-level (person-culture oriented).

The first attributes corruption to overregulation¹⁵⁶, low quality of legislation¹⁵⁷, reproduction of a compromise's culture¹⁵⁸ between politics and several organised, powerful interest

¹⁴⁰ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 14,18.

¹⁴¹ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 80.

¹⁴² P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 166.

¹⁴³ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 24, 81, 83, 84.

¹⁴⁴ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODE 30; P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 4.

¹⁴⁵ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 30, 53, 74.

¹⁴⁶ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 5,19.

¹⁴⁷ See also Kaufmann, D. and Vicente, P.C. (October, 2005), *Legal Corruption*, Second Draft (available online, <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/legalcorporatecorruption.html>).

¹⁴⁸ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 3, 5.

¹⁴⁹ cf. P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 8, 9.

¹⁵⁰ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 9-11, 21-24.

¹⁵¹ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 10,13.

¹⁵² P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 45.

¹⁵³ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 44.

¹⁵⁴ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 46, 47.

¹⁵⁵ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 3-5, 25, 27, 28.

¹⁵⁶ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 25.

¹⁵⁷ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 25.



groups and the serving of small party-political expediencies¹⁵⁹. This is an interesting issue also analysed in the sociology of law (Druwe 1987; Böhret et al. 1988).¹⁶⁰

Only those interests that are organised, represented and are able to exercise pressure are taken into account by the legislative power. Our interviewees distinguish interests in *formal*, *informal*, *'black'* or *'dark'* and *organised*¹⁶¹. During the process of legislation several pressure groups and institutions with various and conflicting interests are involved; their attitudes are significant for social peace. Therefore, laws must be formulated in such a way so that can satisfy as more interests as possible, or at least give the impression of indulging them all. A regulation, a bill which attempts innovations derogating existing powerful interests has very little chances to be accepted and enforced. When a law foresees a many prerequisites for its enforcement reflects that it is the result of conflicting interests which have been arranged. It is defined as process of *negative coordination*: it is a deal that has been achieved while each group was trying to keep off decisions that could be against its interests. This is the reason why it is very difficult to find the sort of interests serving the laws in modern societies and that in contemporary legislation there are neither obvious winners nor obvious losers. Furthermore, the fragmentation of the problem in bureaucracy, in order to reduce its complexity and support its arrangement result that none of the services, departments, ministries or public servants has an overview of it. Therefore, the interest of the services focuses on their own separate area and the elimination of the negative outcomes eventually coming from a different decision to their own. Under the above view, the *politics of small steps* can be explained. In relation to that, legislators are oriented rather to find solutions corresponding to the institutions of their enforcement than to the improvement of the situation, meaning the better arrangement of a problem. This is treated as *conservatism due to structural reasons*. Taking also into consideration that according to our interviewees, the access to power in Greece has been widened, the intensive conflict of interests during the last decades can be explained¹⁶².

The State is not appreciated any more by the Greek citizens, and this took place after the reestablishment of democracy in 1974; the access of everyone to it because of the party politics and populism resulted in its debunk¹⁶³. Corruption is attributed, among others, to the populism used by the political system in Greece, which encourages and tolerates corruption and arbitrariness¹⁶⁴.

Low quality of legislation is reckoned general phenomenon, not restricted in Greece, apparent also in the 'Brussels monstrosities' (European Union)¹⁶⁵ eventually due to different language

¹⁵⁸ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 29, 30, 39, 40.

¹⁵⁹ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 140, 142; P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 31, 32, 67, 68.

¹⁶⁰ Druwe, U. (1987). "Politik", in: *Handbuch der Politikwissenschaft*, Görlitz, A., Prätorius, R. (eds.), Rowohlt: Reinbek bei Hamburg, pp. 393-397; Böhret, C., Jann, W. and Kronenwett, E. (1988). *Innenpolitik und politische Theorie. Ein Studienbuch*, 3rd ed., Westdeutscher Verlag: Opladen.

¹⁶¹ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 31, 32.

¹⁶² P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 33, 34.

¹⁶³ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 45, 33, 34.

¹⁶⁴ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 159.

¹⁶⁵ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 37.



formulation of laws, directives etc.¹⁶⁶ However, in Greece is stronger because of the keen conflict of interests and party-political profit.

Yet, overregulation and low quality of legislation is not enough for corruption. It is associated with low citizens' resistance¹⁶⁷, low aesthetics -especially of politicians¹⁶⁸, low social education and rotten civilization¹⁶⁹ due to abrupt wealth¹⁷⁰. Furthermore, the difficulties of everyday life in Greece exasperate citizens and decline their resistance¹⁷¹. These added to the lack of 'culture of control'¹⁷², result that law abiding depends only to the pride, education and nobility of spirit ('patriotism') of each¹⁷³. Although corrupt practices can be seen as a means to fight inequality, they result in a morbid equality, unequal treatment¹⁷⁴, law insecurity¹⁷⁵, discrediting state's authority¹⁷⁶ and undermining trust to political and judicial system, as well as to civilization and society¹⁷⁷. Poverty is not an excuse for corruption; notwithstanding it is rather a 'populistic' justification for corrupt practices¹⁷⁸, it can be considered a mitigating reason¹⁷⁹.

The other approach (macro, eclectic-value oriented) attributes corruption to politicians, because they decide on the basis of party political criteria, political cost and re-election interests¹⁸⁰ making them tolerant in corruption¹⁸¹. The MPs don't vote according to their consciousness but for their party benefit and accounts the whole discourse as 'fibs of consciences'¹⁸² of the MPs and to corrupt political leadership. All three points contradict to his following arguments: he views local authorities¹⁸³, mass media and trade unionism¹⁸⁴, which according to him protect corrupt civil servants, as the main sources of corruption. Finally, he notes that corruption exists 'only in public sector, in public administration'¹⁸⁵. It is interesting that he refers only once and hasty to grand corruption, namely the state procurement of military/arms equipment and public works¹⁸⁶. Nonetheless, the reasons of

¹⁶⁶ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 38.

¹⁶⁷ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 43, 44.

¹⁶⁸ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 48, 58.

¹⁶⁹ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 23.

¹⁷⁰ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 62.

¹⁷¹ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 60,61.

¹⁷² P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 59.

¹⁷³ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 59, 46.

¹⁷⁴ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 164; P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 12, 13, 20, 21.

¹⁷⁵ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODE 17; P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 57.

¹⁷⁶ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 9, 24.

¹⁷⁷ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 23, 20, 21.

¹⁷⁸ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 84, 85.

¹⁷⁹ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODE 75.

¹⁸⁰ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 126, 127.

¹⁸¹ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 108, 117, 118, 159, 160, 175.

¹⁸² P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 119, 120.

¹⁸³ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 121.

¹⁸⁴ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 146-148.

¹⁸⁵ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 87-89.

¹⁸⁶ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 22, 23.



corruption are to be found in the collapse of the traditional values together with the collapse of 'classic bourgeois family' and that now most people (in power) are 'uplifted peasants', where only money counts¹⁸⁷ and to partiality manipulating social life¹⁸⁸.

The second aspect (micro-level) considers greed, money grabbing, egoism, conceit, arrogance, mimicry and avarice responsible for corruption¹⁸⁹.

The Greek state has made improvements in respect to technology and infrastructure; even so it lags far behind the needs of the time, suffering from '*décollage*'¹⁹⁰, meaning that a gap exists between country's needs, citizens' wishes and state's bids¹⁹¹. Public administration is underpaid¹⁹², working without support in miserable conditions¹⁹³ lacking recognition¹⁹⁴, therefore it finds sometimes its way to petty corruption¹⁹⁵. But, since state employees are public/civil servants operating an office of liability and trust and not a job, their responsibility is higher than of the ordinary people¹⁹⁶.

The foster of corruption are to be found in taxation, urban planning, forest protection, garbage and trash policy¹⁹⁷. In all these areas, and especially the first, legislation is characterised as 'patchwork', a 'medley of regulations' serving a network of mutual interests, thus generalising corruption¹⁹⁸. In the rest areas the interviewees account the existing legislation sufficient; what is failing is the political desire to control or better, to enforce the necessary policies¹⁹⁹.

In general, the interviewees do not think that corruption in Greece is higher or much higher than in other countries²⁰⁰, but that mass media exaggerate for reasons of impression and sensation²⁰¹. This causes diffusion among the citizens²⁰² who in turn accept it as real and true, reproducing and overdrawing from their side. Since the media serve their own interests, exercise a demolishing critique by presenting a disintegrated and broke up Greek state and society²⁰³, a view which is disputed by all²⁰⁴. All three are optimistic about the future, mostly

¹⁸⁷ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 96-104.

¹⁸⁸ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 169.

¹⁸⁹ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 31, 34, 54, 59, 61, 62.

¹⁹⁰ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 54.

¹⁹¹ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 53.

¹⁹² P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 49.

¹⁹³ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 50, 51.

¹⁹⁴ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 51.

¹⁹⁵ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 16, 17.

¹⁹⁶ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 11, 12; P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 166-168.

¹⁹⁷ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODE 15; P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 7, 8, 27, 70, 71, 79, 80; P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 132, 133, 135, 136, 138.

¹⁹⁸ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 29; P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 140, 141, 143, 165.

¹⁹⁹ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODE 45; cf. P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 110, 111, 170, 171.

²⁰⁰ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODE 29.

²⁰¹ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 38-40; P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 77, 78.

²⁰² P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 77.

²⁰³ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODE 43.



because they think that young people are better educated than some decades ago, more cultivated, more cosmopolitan and that Greece can be stronger influenced by the other developed European countries²⁰⁵. Nevertheless, they are either unable to answer how comes that in spite of the alleged improvement in education, cultivation and cosmopolitanism of people, corruption is higher than in the past in more segments of society²⁰⁶, or they justify it with the *greed*²⁰⁷ and the quick getting rich²⁰⁸.

They consider as better measures against corruption, education, cultivation of people, as well as modernisation of public administration, recasting and simplification of legislation, administrative reform²⁰⁹ and strengthening the moral standards²¹⁰. It is interesting that none of them approved repressive policy as a means of control. One of them underlined that repression is superfluous since it comes after the problem²¹¹, and prevention in the sense of proaction violates constitutional rights, while overregulation and severe legislation have been proved inefficient to decrease corruption²¹². In respect to politicians, they suggest lobbying as a more transparent method to promote their own interests and financing than the use of ‘subterranean ways’²¹³.

Concerning the involvement of judges in the stock market ‘scandal’ put on trial in October 2007, one of them noted that he staggered out the news²¹⁴, to let mean –like many of the TG Politics– that not all judges are corrupt²¹⁵. In any case, justice is accounted independent and the fortress, key stone and bedrock of democracy²¹⁶.

It is thought that judges are influenced much more by their close milieu, mainly their family not even their colleagues and the exercised control by the hierarchy than the political climate of the time. However, the Athens bar association expressed in his plenary session in March 2007 its worry for the increased severity of sentencing, the de facto abolishment of the clemency principle, mainly against the disadvantaged social groups, the increasing corporatism of justice, and the big delays in court procedures and adjudication. In the past, ‘law and order politics’ almost never received the approval of the judiciary or state as a general policy, but was on occasion used to target specific social groups for political reasons. However, from the 2000s it has become a legitimate topic of debate. Politicians, members of the government, the judiciary and senior police officers have started calling for tougher measures and more severe sentencing, although initially not to excess. These concerns are

²⁰⁴ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 36, 41-42; P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 52, 53, 74; P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 170, 171.

²⁰⁵ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 20, 21; P4 CODES 69, 70; P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 73, 74.

²⁰⁶ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 60, 61.

²⁰⁷ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 72, 73.

²⁰⁸ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 62.

²⁰⁹ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODE 63.

²¹⁰ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODE 63.

²¹¹ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 54-56.

²¹² P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 66-68.

²¹³ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 55, 56.

²¹⁴ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 47-50.

²¹⁵ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODE 48.

²¹⁶ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 48; P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 52.



reflected in the media where crime, scandals, police and, to a lesser extent, the justice system have become major news items. Finally, the General Inspector recognized indirectly the unequal treatment of citizens (powerful unlike the ordinary people) and thus the selection politics of justice²¹⁷.

He regards lawyers with disdain, and expresses low esteem for women judges implying the same for women in general who tend to consumerism and influence their family²¹⁸. Yet, he refers in an interesting network among lawyers and relatives of judges for pumping customers²¹⁹.

The General Inspector also regards justice²²⁰ inefficient in confronting with the needs of society, overloaded²²¹ slow²²², and expensive²²³, while the young generation of judges²²⁴ are inexperienced for the demands of their profession²²⁵. This is mainly due to the restriction of jurisdiction for the three member courts²²⁶ for financial reasons, whereby counselling was working as a real school for the younger judges, and the enlargement of the one member courts' jurisdiction²²⁷. Additionally, the low wages²²⁸ discourage and depress judges, since they face work overload and lack of administrative support. Nevertheless, justice is from the better paid public services in Greece.

All of them appreciate the work of EU although they consider that its main interest is to improve competition in the global economy and to control the *capital of corruption*²²⁹. Moreover, that if legislation is adjusted to the legal culture of each country²³⁰ could have positive impact, and the intra-european cooperation in the area is necessary to face the issue²³¹. Anyway, EU cannot be counted as a working model any more²³², because of its enlargement it is faded out; it is debunked and needs our support²³³.

²¹⁷ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 75.

²¹⁸ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 50, 51.

²¹⁹ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 76-79.

²²⁰ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 92, 93.

²²¹ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 59.

²²² P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 60-63.

²²³ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 53-57.

²²⁴ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 70, 71.

²²⁵ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 65-68.

²²⁶ The courts of first instance in Greece for criminal and civil cases are constituted either by one or three-members, depending on the seriousness of the case; the same applies to the juvenile (criminal) courts.

²²⁷ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 69.

²²⁸ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODE 94.

²²⁹ P4 TG JUSTICE_AAP_K: CODES 20, 21; P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 16, 27; cf. P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 63a.

²³⁰ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 9-11.

²³¹ P22 TG POLITICS_PAD_GIPA: CODES 5, 6, 25, 26, 39-42.

²³² P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODE 66.

²³³ P5 TG JUSTICE_STE_D: CODES 63-65.



4.4. TG III POLICE

4.4.1. General Comments

Police was one of the TGs with which we had serious difficulties in accessing them, either due to formal prerequisites we had to fulfil (written application, sending questionnaires, approval of interview), or work overload and meeting arrangement. The interview with the Service was very formal and carried out with no use of recorder corresponding to its wish. The meeting with the Police's trade unionist was fruitful and loose/relaxed.

4.4.2. Evaluation Units

P14 TG POLICE_DEY
P15 TG POLICE_PFPS

4.4.3. Interviews' Analysis

According to our interviewees corruption is a wide²³⁴ area with various forms, exactly like organized crime²³⁵, whereby the corrupt attribute to certain activities (and cases) is an issue of interpretation. They remain loyal to the legal concept as defined in the criminal law, yet, all three describe it as social 'phenomenon'²³⁶, oscillating between a sociological approach (social 'phenomenon') and a medical one (social 'sickness').

In our discussion the Service of Internal Affairs (DEY) used for its argumentation the national legislation²³⁷ and the definition of the European Council²³⁸. DEY's focus on the above definition was expected, not only because of its authority and inspective role, but also due to the formal interviewing; one police officer was reading answers to our questionnaire and commenting from time to time with the presence of her superior who was free to participate whenever he thought it was necessary. In general the Service was concentrated on the normative context of anticorruption policy.

The other interviewee, from the Police Servants' Federation is very sceptical about the international definitions and consequently the policies used. He adopts a constructivist approach, stressing the different interpretations of the same fact or activity ('everything is an issue of interpretation')²³⁹, according to which the term corruption is strongly related with the peculiarities of each society the offenders' group and the formulation of charges. His discourse is free, his view open for discussion and unconventional, since he doesn't have the same official reservations with the officers of DEY. Moreover, his position as representative

²³⁴ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 5.

²³⁵ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 56, 57.

²³⁶ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 92; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 76.

²³⁷ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 2.

²³⁸ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 2, 15.

²³⁹ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 57.



of low-ranking police officers, mainly those on the beat justifies his loose attitudes and the quality of his discourse²⁴⁰.

In any case, both sides distinguish between ‘petty’ and ‘grand’ corruption²⁴¹, according to a) the social groups involved²⁴², and b) the amount of money used²⁴³, or the services exchange. Petty corruption is related to lower and middle social strata as ‘survival’ strategy to the difficulties of life, while grand corruption with those at the top of the socio-economic pyramid.

Moreover, we came upon an official and an unofficial discourse on corruption. The first is expressed by the officers of the Directorate of Internal Affairs and the second by the Police Union’s representative. Their institutional role corresponds to their different approach and openness to the researchers. Although the representatives of DEY don’t dispute its existence in society, its limits are defined narrower, than by the other interviewee. The Union’s representative regards corruption in society as ‘usual’ social behaviour. But he refers rather to a general behaviour, not corresponding to approved social – moral standards, than to illegal practices. Nevertheless, both sides didn’t show any special concern about corruption in police, and they generally agree about policy measures for dealing with it.

For one interviewee corruption in society is expanded, claiming that ‘Greek society acclimatized itself to corruption and bribery’²⁴⁴. Corruption characterizes the social behaviour²⁴⁵, therefore he is pessimistic about the chances of recovery.

Although the other interviewees don’t dispute the existence of the problem²⁴⁶ ‘in all social classes, as well as in public services’²⁴⁷, its limits are defined narrower²⁴⁸ than the Union’s representative. Their view is opposed to the generalization that corruption is ‘an extensive and diffuse problem’ justifying in the mean time their efforts to control it. According to DEY, generalisations due to failing statistics²⁴⁹ and other valid data²⁵⁰, along with the over-presentation by mass media²⁵¹ during the last decade, have created a false image about the seriousness and size of the problem in Greece.

DEY is trying to move and put the blame on Greek society, not always successfully, countering that most of the citizens criticize and disapprove corruption²⁵². It is the only group, which didn’t throw the baby with the pool.

²⁴⁰ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 125, 130, 131.

²⁴¹ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODE 141.

²⁴² P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODE 13; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 52-56, 58.

²⁴³ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 14, 95, 96; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 49.

²⁴⁴ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 100,101.

²⁴⁵ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 3, 99.

²⁴⁶ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 40.

²⁴⁷ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 52.

²⁴⁸ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 11-14, 24, 43.

²⁴⁹ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 13.

²⁵⁰ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 14.

²⁵¹ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 12.

²⁵² P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 132; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 7.



All three interviewees see international and European cooperation in the field (organized crime included) useful²⁵³ and necessary due to the globalization²⁵⁴, despite the bureaucratic difficulties of coordination²⁵⁵.

The interviewees attribute (mainly the Union's representative) corruption initially to Greek society's superstructure, affected its legal, social, cultural and political institutions; he used often terms such as *mentality*²⁵⁶, *historical and cultural residues*²⁵⁷, still without further specification. By that, he tries to explain the development of collective attitudes, various concepts and interpretations of corrupt practices, as well as their control in different societies. Under the above point of view he refers further to the organizational structure of the state and the public administration. Bureaucracy, overregulation and complex legislation²⁵⁸ are considered to be the main reasons for corruption²⁵⁹.

The *institutions' crisis* (delegitimation) is overstated in the discourse and is seen as cause and result of corruption in Greece. Its extent though, is not considered the same for Union's representative and DEY's officers. According to the first, crisis is general²⁶⁰ followed by an overall scorn for the state, police included²⁶¹. DEY from its side, attempts (without disputing it) to decrease its extent and intensity²⁶². The police officers promote the idea that it is either a media construction²⁶³, or the result of insufficient information of the citizens²⁶⁴, maintaining for example that police is highly appreciated²⁶⁵.

Furthermore, corruption is related to *personality's formation*²⁶⁶ (character etc.), a view advanced by the Union's interviewee²⁶⁷. Similarly, although less striking, DEY refers to 'elastic-conscience'²⁶⁸ and 'personality'²⁶⁹ (meaning opportunism and profiteering).

After all, it is worth mentioning that police's approach was not consistent with a *social analysis* of corruption which seemed to follow, especially the one of the Federation. The system is not as strong as initially the Union representative presented, since whatever behaviour a person follows, it is, according to him, the result of *rational choice* and *free*

²⁵³ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 63, 64; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 18.

²⁵⁴ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 17.

²⁵⁵ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 65, 66, 58, 59.

²⁵⁶ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 2, 7.

²⁵⁷ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODE 102.

²⁵⁸ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 50.

²⁵⁹ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 4, 104; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 50, 62.

²⁶⁰ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 22-24.

²⁶¹ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 29-31, 33.

²⁶² P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 22, 24, 33, 43.

²⁶³ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 25.

²⁶⁴ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 30, 31.

²⁶⁵ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 34.

²⁶⁶ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 5, 15, 87, 137.

²⁶⁷ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 2, 4, 83-86, 89, 136.

²⁶⁸ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 47.

²⁶⁹ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 39.



will²⁷⁰, even though he is aware of the ‘injustices of the system’ and their role to corrupt exchanges²⁷¹.

Strong hierarchical structures of organisation followed by heavy bureaucracy²⁷² and low wages²⁷³, contribute along with the *anonymity* afforded in big cities²⁷⁴ and increase of illegal opportunities²⁷⁵ to corrupt practices of police officers.

Nevertheless, both sides estimate corruption in police to be limited and in any case, not higher than in other public services²⁷⁶; yet, it is implied that the ‘famous’ *esprit de corps* operates against the clearance of such cases in the police force²⁷⁷. Furthermore, the *low interest of the leadership* (political and natural) in the financial situation of police officers, and their everyday problems²⁷⁸, but above all its ‘failure to inspire and represent the officers’²⁷⁹ results in its delegitimation²⁸⁰. In our discussion the interviewee of the Federation distinguishes among the rank and file of the corps and notes a discriminatory treatment in the police, such as the ‘preferential treatment’²⁸¹ of the Service of Internal Affairs not only in cases of corruption but also in their higher remuneration. With this, according to our interviewee, the leadership acknowledges where the core problem is for the ordinary police officers.

DEY’s approach however, is very cautious because of its institutional role and position. It does not question leadership’s interests in fighting corruption (in general) and mentions several times to the improvements in corruption control, exactly because of the good cooperation with the leadership²⁸².

Both groups view the institution of the Service of Internal Affairs as innovation, corresponding to their long demand for diminishing corruption in the police²⁸³. Yet, its efficiency is downplayed due to its bureaucratic structure²⁸⁴ and its subordination to the police leadership²⁸⁵.

Our interviewees relate the causes of corruption in Greece with the policy measures against it. They agree that its full elimination is impossible, not because of its extent but of its normality

²⁷⁰ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODE 92.

²⁷¹ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 110, 111, 118-121.

²⁷² P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 28, 50, 51, 94, 95.

²⁷³ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODE 16; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 55.

²⁷⁴ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODE 18.

²⁷⁵ He associates some forms of corruption with organized crime, mainly trafficking and drug trafficking, imported and expanded from the ex communist countries P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODE 62.

²⁷⁶ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 83, 103.

²⁷⁷ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 35, 36, 39; P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 134, 135.

²⁷⁸ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 34-39.

²⁷⁹ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODE 40.

²⁸⁰ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 46-49.

²⁸¹ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 70, 72.

²⁸² P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 14, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31.

²⁸³ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODE 74, 78.

²⁸⁴ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 79-81.

²⁸⁵ P15 TG POLICE_FFPS: CODES 73-76.



and its sources in outdated ‘established mentalities’²⁸⁶. They stress on *prevention* instead of *suppression and control*²⁸⁷, on education and socialisation of a *new citizen type*²⁸⁸ (referred as investment in social structures)²⁸⁹. Whatever policy on this background needs long-term planning²⁹⁰ and time for its outcomes²⁹¹.

In addition, they suggest administrative reform²⁹², modernisation of public services, modernisation of justice in order to increase its effectiveness²⁹³ justice’s speedup, use of swift and exemplary sentences²⁹⁴, emphasis on prevention²⁹⁵, limiting of public servant’s discretionary authority in dealing with specific cases²⁹⁶. All accept that each citizen has a key role against corruption. What are missing in the suggested measures of our interviewees are those pertaining to the police.

4.5. TG IV MEDIA

4.5.1. General Comments

The Media representatives, who participated in our research, are columnists in Athenian newspapers of high circulation, while one of them is member of the administrative council of the Editors’ Association of Athens’s Daily Newspapers (ESHEA). They had either covered the case studies in the first phase of the programme, or have occasionally written articles about corruption in Greece. They are not ‘stars’ of the local journalism, a reason for which we asked them to participate in our research, and they are working in the media for a long time (at least 20 years). We didn’t contact any TV or radio journalist, because of our experience from the first period; we considered having hardly any chance for an interview. In addition, we adhered in some degree to the Press, which was our main source in the first period.

4.5.2. Evaluations Units

P6 TG MME_DOL

P7 TG MME_ELEF

P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA

²⁸⁶ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 55, 113, 115; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODES 6, 63.

²⁸⁷ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 42, 43; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 65.

²⁸⁸ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 112-116.

²⁸⁹ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 42.

²⁹⁰ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 113; P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 63.

²⁹¹ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODE 115.

²⁹² P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 75.

²⁹³ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 73.

²⁹⁴ P15 TG POLICE_PFPS: CODES 44, 67, 68.

²⁹⁵ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 74.

²⁹⁶ P14 TG POLICE_DEY: CODE 67.

4.5.3. Interviews' Analysis

All three journalists analysed corruption, its origin and causes, as well as its forms from a quasi historical-sociological approach.

The phenomenon is defined as 'social, political, and cultural'²⁹⁷, with ranging seriousness (petty – grand corruption)²⁹⁸, associated mainly with the 'habitus' of a society²⁹⁹. The phenomenon is defined as 'an exchange which is not necessarily monetary and not always illegal' (in terms of law)³⁰⁰, although money are very often at the core of the exchange. It is inherent in the capitalist system of western democracies³⁰¹ (*'the political-economic system cannot live without corruption'*³⁰²). Therefore considering corruption a 'social disease is a trivial ('dog-cheap') justification' used by the mass media and politicians³⁰³.

Culture is regarded as the significant variable for explaining not only the nature but also the forms of corruption in Greece. Some of the interviewees distinguish between corruption in the East and corruption in the West³⁰⁴, where 'the eastern you move, the bigger is the problem'. Corruption acquires peculiar characteristics in the discourse of our interviewees growing or decreasing depending on cultural developments. Starting from a sketchy – in our view – distinction between an indefinable East and an equally nebulous West³⁰⁵.

Greece is characterized as a country of 'semi-Eastern – semi-Western type'³⁰⁶, which goes us back to the ideological dilemma of the Greek intelligentsia during the middle of the 19th century, whether Greece belongs to the East or to the West, as Markos Renieris wrote in his famous article "What it is Greece: East or West?", which initially was published anonymously in 1842. In this the author criticized Adamantios Korais, one of the most well known representatives of the Greek Enlightenment, for his adherence to Western civilization and the characteristics of Greek culture.

Although there is no doubt about corruption in Western societies, what differentiates it from its 'Eastern version' is the existence of 'rules of the game'³⁰⁷. In addition, although an 'export of corruption' takes place from the West (mainly multinational corporations) to third (underdeveloped, developing) countries the 'rules of the game' within western societies remain stable³⁰⁸.

²⁹⁷ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 1, 3, 44, 9, 12.

²⁹⁸ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 2.

²⁹⁹ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 6.

³⁰⁰ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 49; P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 50, 122.

³⁰¹ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 56.

³⁰² P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 11.

³⁰³ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 85.

³⁰⁴ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 44, 48.

³⁰⁵ This distinction suggest the also rather obscure and methodologically dicey distinction that Samuel Huntington attempts in his well-known book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

³⁰⁶ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 117.

³⁰⁷ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 46, 50, 56.

³⁰⁸ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHE: CODE 22.



Apart from heavy bureaucratic structures³⁰⁹ and overregulation producing corruption³¹⁰, the journalists search the origins of the phenomenon in Greece, in the institution of the New Greek state after the liberation from the Ottoman Turks in the 19th century, its structures and the establishment of the political system.

Their analysis refers to the structure of social power and its division among the dominant social groups (social elites). A significant factor for the extent of corruption is considered to be the ‘distorted development of the social and financial structures’³¹¹, which took place in the post-war era (after 2nd World War). According to the interviewees, during the 80’s the problem in Greece is expanded and took modern forms³¹², while during the 90’s corrupt practices were established, improved and refined.

The transformation of the Greek economy (following the ‘modernization dogma’), the influx of EU funds, and the consequent boost of the private economy in relation to that of the state decline and its structural shortcomings – especially the control mechanisms³¹³ –, expanded corruption followed by its side effects in collective behaviours (state and society).

In the whole problematic ‘the political-economical system’ is dominant; this not only produces corruption (mainly grand corruption) but also reproduces it. The protagonists of this system are the powerful economic and political groups, the organized pressure groups³¹⁴, and the economic and political oligarchy³¹⁵. The interviewees adopt the dominant view of the 70’s and early 80’s about the ways these groups have been established, referring to an ‘intermediary capital with Greek peculiarities’³¹⁶ and sometimes of a ‘state-sponsored capital’³¹⁷ that has privileged relations with political power.

Summing up, the interplay of political and economical interests is related to the original accumulation of the Greek capital in the 19th and 20th century (see also TG Politics). A similar historical-socioeconomic approach is attempted for the development the modern political system in Greece and the way it eventually reproduces corruption. For the media representatives, ‘political corruption’ is strongly related with the operation of political parties, as well as their establishment³¹⁸ and financing. The outcome is dependence on and reproduction of the dominant socio-economic groups in a context of generalized corruption, because the economic system has never operated in terms of international capital and true competition³¹⁹. The interviewee emphasizes that even in the 90’s, when the Greek capital

³⁰⁹ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 96, 97, 102.

³¹⁰ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 105.

³¹¹ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 10, 29, 73; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 69.

³¹² P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 64.

³¹³ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 65; P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 53.

³¹⁴ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 18.

³¹⁵ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 20, 24; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 73.

³¹⁶ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 27.

³¹⁷ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 20, 21, 22, 26, 61.

³¹⁸ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 1.

³¹⁹ The interviewee emphasizes that even in the 90’s, when the Greek capital moved beyond the national borders, this took place in the Balkans where, according to him, are characterized by an extensive interplay of political and economic power (P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 62). This is a rather rough approach, because the geographic



moved beyond the national borders, this took place in the Balkans where are characterized by an extensive interplay of political and economic power³²⁰. This is a rather rough approach, because the geographic area is the natural place for Greek investments and bypasses the discussed ‘export of corruption’ which takes place from big multinational corporations of the West to the developing and underdeveloped³²¹, starting from the neighbouring countries. In parallel, the powerful groups (‘economic elite’) involved in corrupt practices and such exchanges are those who reproduce it for their own interests³²², and are the main parties’ financiers³²³.

After all, the model of corruption in Greece, according to our interviewees has a triangle form. The political and economic power is at the base, and the mass media at the top (see also below). The system (sometimes the use of the term is extremely vague) is regarded operating independent (without social control), reproducing itself together with collective attitudes and social behaviours. In short, the ‘system’ is strong, distorting conscience and disabling mechanisms in order to support its own interests³²⁴.

All the interviewees agree that corruption in contemporary Greece is extended³²⁵, covering the public life³²⁶, ‘representing a serious social problem’³²⁷ and can eventually be followed by ‘uncontrollable situations’³²⁸. Nonetheless, corruption is counted to be a general problem of all countries, inherent in our times³²⁹. Furthermore, they distinguish between petty and grand corruption³³⁰, and refer to its intensity and development corresponding to the development of the political and economic system³³¹.

Corruption is presented as a dominant social attitude³³² and acceptable behaviour in the exchange of the citizen with the state³³³, irrespective of its eventual justification in the current system of power that produces injustices, inequalities and discrimination against the lower and middle class.

area is the natural place for Greece for investments and bypasses the discussed “export of corruption” which takes place from big multinational corporations of the West to the underdeveloped and developing P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 22.

³²⁰P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 62.

³²¹ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 22.

³²² P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODES 45, 46, 47.

³²³ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODES 49, 50.

³²⁴ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 72; P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 221.

³²⁵ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 2, 74; P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 23; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 112.

³²⁶ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 54, 55; P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODES 24-26; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 224.

³²⁷ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 16.

³²⁸ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 111.

³²⁹ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 59.

³³⁰ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODES 24, 25.

³³¹ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 16.

³³² P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 191.

³³³ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 121, 218, 236.



According to the interviewees, contemporary Greek society has incorporated corrupt practices as accepted social behaviour, because as society is based on reciprocity, mutual services (peculiar form of solidarity?)³³⁴. At the same time, they accept the frequent and exaggerated references to the topic, together with its superficial official approach do nothing more than to befog and reproduce the phenomenon³³⁵. For the media representatives, the extent of corruption in Greece is inversely proportional to the social reaction it provokes. Compared with the past, greater tolerance and lower social resistance is observed³³⁶, while the politicians' declarations about their commitment and effort to decrease corruption are considered meaningless and for show off³³⁷.

As mentioned above, all interviewees agree for the tolerance's increase about corruption. Two interpretations are promoted. The first sees the 'dominant (political and economical) system' neutralising citizens' reactions³³⁸. Mass media have a significant role in this process³³⁹ and in their exchange with the 'dominant political power' (see political parties) takes care of its self-maintenance³⁴⁰.

The second view, without ignoring the role of the mass media, ascribes greater importance to a socialisation of the citizens which produced not only tolerance but also acceptance (especially those of the lower and middle social strata) to these practices³⁴¹.

All the interviewees accept that corrupt practices (mainly petty corruption) may operate for the 'redistribution of wealth'³⁴², thus is characterized as 'functional'³⁴³. At the same time they underline the inherent inequality between state-citizens relations because of this exchange. This cooperation puts automatically the limits of the relationship, because not all citizens can use such means or methods (relations). Therefore, it is an unwholesome equality³⁴⁴ leading to an impasse³⁴⁵.

'Redistribution' is not real redistribution of resources in favour of the social disadvantage and poor population, but as a way through which petit bourgeoisie exploit a 'grey zone' of the public sector (not defined by the interviewees and rather extended) with corrupt exchanges and mutual services (bribery, clientelism). To the question how many chances have the ordinary people not to use illegal practices, given the social inequality and the discrimination, the answer is that no illegal practices can be accepted³⁴⁶. Therefore, the individual is regarded as 'pure political being' who acts only according the common interest and not the personal or

³³⁴ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODES 27, 28.

³³⁵ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 37.

³³⁶ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 29, 30; P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHE : CODE 17.

³³⁷ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 57, 58, 244.

³³⁸ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 31.

³³⁹ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 33, 34.

³⁴⁰ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 37.

³⁴¹ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 40, 41; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 228.

³⁴² P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 65.

³⁴³ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 119, 120.

³⁴⁴ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 65, 66; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 158.

³⁴⁵ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODES 19-21.

³⁴⁶ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 21.



group benefit. The other new justifies such practices, though it rejects them. Furthermore, concerning the limits of tolerance and social erosion, the first approach sees corruption extended in all social strata³⁴⁷, while the second refers to social fatigue citizens' dissatisfaction and signs of increasing reaction. They consider that there is a rising social dissatisfaction³⁴⁸, but not yet organised: this behaviour is expressed in a rather destructive than constructive way³⁴⁹. In any case, Greek society demands changes, rules and improvements³⁵⁰.

In spite of the criticism to EU policies and other international organizations for this issue (OECD, World Bank, Transparency International), the whole effort is appreciated in general and considered to be positive for Greece in particular. And this because it supports a thorough analysis and discussion, as well as because it promotes the education and the information of the society³⁵¹. It is accepted³⁵² that a closer cooperation of Greece with EU in corruption control will contribute to its reduction, mainly because of the financial costs required for the European convergence. Moreover, Greece's integration in the structures of EU will support³⁵³ the re-organization of the political parties³⁵⁴.

The problem however in the relations between EU and Greece starts, according to the media representatives, either from the structural weaknesses or unwillingness of the Greek political and economic system to adjust to regulatory reforms³⁵⁵. The interviewees note that the Greek governments simply accepted the anticorruption legislation of EU, without participating in their formulation, since they haven't worked them out, and started integrating them in the national legislation with delays and following only roughly the anti-corruption policies³⁵⁶. This results in adopting approaches and policies from abroad, which certainly couldn't take into account the forms and extent of the problem to each country, since the country itself hadn't expressed its own view.

All the interviewees strongly criticize the use of corruption by the media, especially the electronic ones. According to them, media, being private enterprises, are the main players in corrupt exchanges serving their own financial interests³⁵⁷. Media are characterized by their close relationships with the prevailing political and economic interest groups³⁵⁸. The interviewees recognize the absence of independent media and the weakness of the Press for independent journalism. Consequently, media don't correspond to their basic mission for

³⁴⁷ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 40, 41; P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 33 ; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 228.

³⁴⁸ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 67.

³⁴⁹ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 68, 69.

³⁵⁰ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 76-78.

³⁵¹ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODES 13, 14.

³⁵² P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 245.

³⁵³ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 76.

³⁵⁴ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 80.

³⁵⁵ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 71.

³⁵⁶ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODES 72-74.

³⁵⁷ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODES 34, 35; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 34.

³⁵⁸ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 82-84; P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 36; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 184, 187, 193, 203, 204.



objective information and social control, but work as intermediaries of political and economic interests³⁵⁹. At the same time, the rapid increase of their influence to society, mainly of television, resulted in an absurdity: Media have replaced the institutional control with a television one³⁶⁰. Therefore, the discussion in relation to corruption increases either superficial, or nihilistic and destructive³⁶¹. Media don't promote productive discussion but their agenda is defined according to their own interests and not, by the real problems and social needs³⁶².

The view of our target group about corruption in politics is also critical. Politicians are captured³⁶³ between the prevalent image which is promoted by the media and the alleged demands of their electoral clientele. The result is lack of political courage to enforce measures of transparency and anticorruption with the repeated justification of the 'political cost'³⁶⁴. Media representatives attribute the reasons of reluctance, to the formation of the party political system in the new Greek state and its submission to foreign powers. Summing up, apart from the accepted media role to the modern party system³⁶⁵, the basic factors that (re)produce corruption in politics are the shortcomings of their democratic organisation³⁶⁶, its person oriented character³⁶⁷, its reliance on economic interests³⁶⁸ and inefficient control mechanism³⁶⁹ for party and electoral expenses. In fact, the existing control mechanisms (e.g. the electoral committee) are completely inefficient and powerless.

Corruption in public administration and corruption in politics³⁷⁰ are two different things although they are strongly related to each other³⁷¹: it is visible and petty, though inherent in the structures of PA³⁷².

The reasons for this situation are attributed to the so-called 'distorted economic development' of the country³⁷³, to the existence of heavy bureaucracy³⁷⁴, to the outdated administrative structures and the intervention of party-politics to serve their clientele³⁷⁵.

³⁵⁹ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 35, 38.

³⁶⁰ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 207.

³⁶¹ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 81; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 183; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 181.

³⁶² P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 32.

³⁶³ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 44.

³⁶⁴ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODES 29, 30.

³⁶⁵ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 31-33.

³⁶⁶ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 28, 29.

³⁶⁷ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 31.

³⁶⁸ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 4, 6.

³⁶⁹ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 12, 14, 16; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 26; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 17, 23, 24, 27.

³⁷⁰ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 2.

³⁷¹ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 124-128.

³⁷² P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 115, 116, 235.

³⁷³ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 123.

³⁷⁴ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 130, 137.

³⁷⁵ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 117, 123.



Our interviewees emphasize on administrative reform³⁷⁶, computerization and overall modernization of Public Administration, as well as its control mechanisms³⁷⁷. Moreover, they accentuate the need for investments to the human and material capital of Public Administration³⁷⁸ and better regulation³⁷⁹.

They refer to structural changes without specifying them³⁸⁰, which have to be fulfilled gradually, in order the generalized collapse of the existing power system to be avoided³⁸¹. All in all, reducing corruption in Greece demands commitment³⁸² of the citizens, education and awareness, together with an effective social control³⁸³. And this because, as one interviewee said: ‘Democracy is a very difficult system that requires continuous alertness and control by the citizens’³⁸⁴.

4.6. TG V CIVIL SOCIETY-NGOs

4.6.1. General Comments

Notwithstanding NGOs are relatively new structures in Greek society, existing since '90s, their number is very high. They work mainly in three areas: environment/ecology, local issues, social issues, with various success. Our interviewees represent three NGOs (TI-Hellas, Citizens' Movement and Network 21). TI-Hellas, as known, is working on anti – corruption issues, Citizens' Movement on general social issues and Network 21 is working on national issues such as external affairs, migration policy, Greek language, Greek Diaspora, demography etc. We carried out four interviews (TI-Hellas in two sessions).

4.6.2. Evaluation Units

P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL
P10 TG NGOs_KINHSI POLITON
P12 TG NGOs_TI_Hellas
P13 TG NGOs_free_ex_TI

³⁷⁶ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODES 70, 103, 104; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 140, 141.

³⁷⁷ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODES 65, 68, 69.

³⁷⁸ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODES 40, 41, 43.

³⁷⁹ P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 104.

³⁸⁰ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 71; P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 11; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODES 96, 103, 162.

³⁸¹ P7 TG MME_ELEF: CODE 110; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 113.

³⁸² P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODE 40.

³⁸³ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODES 7, 8, 11; P6 TG MME_DOL: CODE 169.

³⁸⁴ P8 TG MME_ENET/ESHEA: CODES 9, 59.

4.6.3. Interviews' Analysis

Concerning the meaning of corruption, the interviewees take into consideration its moral, socio-political, and economical aspects. First of all, they accept the moral elements of anti-corruption debate³⁸⁵, according to which they link corruption to *dishonesty*, *shameless behaviour*³⁸⁶, *rotten system*³⁸⁷, *immoral behaviour* (even with sexual harassment³⁸⁸), and view it as *social illness, disease etc.*³⁸⁹ and an issue of personal moral standards³⁹⁰. However, they are sceptical whether a policy can be effective though crusades³⁹¹ and overdrawing. Corruption is also accounted for negative *socio-political and economical phenomenon*³⁹² associated with the State³⁹³ and economical structures³⁹⁴. Under this view, corruption is considered a process whereby a person uses his/her power and authority not for the benefit of the organization he/ she participates – either public or private – but for his/her own good fit³⁹⁵. Corruption may involve financial – tangible³⁹⁶, as well as intangible assets facilitating³⁹⁷ or expanding an exchange network³⁹⁸. Corruption is described as a negative social reality³⁹⁹, and is used in exchange with *bribery-gift*⁴⁰⁰, *'dealing under the table'*⁴⁰¹, *citizen's and employees' mistreatment*⁴⁰², *'buying out' – redemption* (e.g. of a public service)⁴⁰³, *use of means*⁴⁰⁴, *collusion of interests*⁴⁰⁵, *favouritism*⁴⁰⁶, *economic or political scandals*⁴⁰⁷, *money laundering*⁴⁰⁸, *tax evasion, insurance leaks, economic crime*⁴⁰⁹ etc. Nonetheless, they admit that some forms of corruption do not violate laws but is the use of informal methods to bypass

³⁸⁵ P10 TG_NGOs_KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 64.

³⁸⁶ P10 TG NGOs_KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 56.

³⁸⁷ P10 TG NGOs_KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 149.

³⁸⁸ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 1.

³⁸⁹ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 1.

³⁹⁰ P10 TG NGOs_KINHSEI POLITON: CODES 138, 139.

³⁹¹ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 1.

³⁹² P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 90.

³⁹³ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 3.

³⁹⁴ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 81.

³⁹⁵ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 95.

³⁹⁶ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 94.

³⁹⁷ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 96.

³⁹⁸ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 56.

³⁹⁹ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 75.

⁴⁰⁰ P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 17.

⁴⁰¹ P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 26.

⁴⁰² P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 54; P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 142.

⁴⁰³ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 7.

⁴⁰⁴ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 89.

⁴⁰⁵ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 76.

⁴⁰⁶ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 8.

⁴⁰⁷ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 247.

⁴⁰⁸ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 188.

⁴⁰⁹ P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 3.



bureaucracy and speed up the accomplishment – fulfilment of a right (e.g. a licence⁴¹⁰, cf. TG JUSTICE).

Occasionally, the interviewees admit not knowing the exact meaning of the term⁴¹¹, and agree that its overuse may not be helpful to describe and confront the problem⁴¹². According to them, corruption evolves mainly in the interface between public and private sector⁴¹³. In our discussion, they focus on everyday corruption and attribute it to the shortcomings of public administration:

- a) Heavy bureaucracy⁴¹⁴, big size and low efficiency.⁴¹⁵
- b) Insufficient internal control mechanisms of public administration.⁴¹⁶
- c) Manipulation of public sector by the political system.⁴¹⁷
- d) Loose law enforcement.⁴¹⁸
- e) Slow justice: ‘when justice is delayed, in fact justice is denied’⁴¹⁹. The big delay in courts’ adjudication, result several times in statute barring.

The public services most affected by corrupt methods are urban planning⁴²⁰, land registry services⁴²¹, national defence (military supplies, especially arms⁴²²), public works and few others granting various licenses (personal or entrepreneurial)⁴²³.

Another area referred is policing and internal security, related to our second case study of the first phase. Criminal networks buy out protection and the public services of police. Illegal naturalizations and illegal immigration are examples of this form of corruption, as traffickers and party politics are the profiteers at the expense of social cohesion, national labour force and public order⁴²⁴. Inadequate police protection and police inertia⁴²⁵ are associated with this form of corruption. According to this interview, the previous form is the most serious, since it discredits the state and questions public security⁴²⁶. Offering immunity to criminals, public administration can no longer provide security which is the basic precondition for society’s proper functioning and therefore is no reason to pay taxes for it⁴²⁷.

⁴¹⁰ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 12.

⁴¹¹ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 1.

⁴¹² P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 3, 4.

⁴¹³ P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 35.

⁴¹⁴ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODES 19, 24, 43, 129, 27, 29.

⁴¹⁵ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 43-55.

⁴¹⁶ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 241, 228, 16; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODES 146, 148.

⁴¹⁷ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 121; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 21; P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODES 132, 133, 134.

⁴¹⁸ P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 28; P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 21; P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 230-232, 131.

⁴¹⁹ P10 TG NGOS KINHSI POLITON: CODE 32.

⁴²⁰ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 13.

⁴²¹ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 34.

⁴²² P10 TG NGOS KINHSI POLITON: CODE 36.

⁴²³ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 118; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODES 39, 80.

⁴²⁴ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 21, 245, 246.

⁴²⁵ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 36-38.

⁴²⁶ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 24, 25, 54, 55, 92.

⁴²⁷ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 65.



Concerning grand corruption, our interviewees focus on politics. They consider that the Greek electoral system, with the big districts and the subsequent expensive pre-election campaigns⁴²⁸, makes politicians captured by private donors and interests⁴²⁹; the same applies with the parties⁴³⁰. Meritocracy is faded out and opacity is favoured in party financing⁴³¹. Although the legislation for party financing is newly revised increasing the money submitted, and publication of political parties balance-sheets and candidates' sources is requested, most political parties and candidates, continue to be supported not only by the state budget, as the law foresees, but also by other not determined sources over the rates that the law sets⁴³². MAYO case was an example of political parties' reliance on such financing at the grey zone of law⁴³³.

In relation to corruption in the private sector and economy, there are two approaches. According to the first, the interviewees use the argumentation of economy's target group: rules and ethics of competition and market forces, corporate governance, fame and enterprise are put in danger, use of corrupt practices by small family--owned enterprises etc.⁴³⁴.

According to the second approach, corrupt practices are often used in private sector, especially when the economic activities are not based on free competition and innovation⁴³⁵. Such examples are attaining state supplies and public works⁴³⁶, stockbrokers' illegal business⁴³⁷, unlawful completion⁴³⁸, fraud – especially securities fraud⁴³⁹ – and other economic crimes and commercial violations. One interviewee criticises the Federation of Greek Industries for concealing business' participation in illegal practices by attributing responsibility to the public sector⁴⁴⁰. Several Greek enterprises are nourished by the State⁴⁴¹, which they blame for corruption, and are over protected⁴⁴², thus facilitating oligopolistic practices, for example, collusion by firms. Therefore free competition and transparency, as in the case of EU financing which was also followed by increasing corruption⁴⁴³, are impeded at the expense of the citizens⁴⁴⁴.

⁴²⁸ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 5.

⁴²⁹ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 209.

⁴³⁰ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 6.

⁴³¹ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 218, 213, 215.

⁴³² P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODES 85, 86.

⁴³³ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 68.

⁴³⁴ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODES 82, 86, 256; P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 245, 236, 238, 234, 242, 240, 243, 244, 247, 251-255, 124, 126-131; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODES 40, 42; P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 170.

⁴³⁵ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 175.

⁴³⁶ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 203.

⁴³⁷ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODES 84, 96.

⁴³⁸ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 92, 197.

⁴³⁹ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 182.

⁴⁴⁰ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 178, 208.

⁴⁴¹ P13 TG NGOS free_ex_TI: CODES 11, 113.

⁴⁴² P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODES 106, 108.

⁴⁴³ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 135, 136.

⁴⁴⁴ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODES 110, 114, 115.



All in all, corruption is regarded leading to a vicious cycle – a dead end, where the state merges with private sector (enterprises and mass media) interests since none of them operates without the other⁴⁴⁵.

The interviewees criticise corruption from a moral as well as a social-economical point of view. It is considered responsible for under-development, inequality⁴⁴⁶ and uncompetitiveness discouraging foreign investments⁴⁴⁷, while the big size of dysfunctional public sector diminishes society's productivity and wealth⁴⁴⁸. The target group rejects any positive effect that such practices eventually have⁴⁴⁹ on counteracting social inequalities (i.e. unemployment)⁴⁵⁰. Apart from economical reasoning, the interviewees also reject corruption on political level since it destroys the constitutional organization of the state and the core meaning of democracy⁴⁵¹.

The interviewees neither overestimate, nor underestimate the CPIs⁴⁵²; they consider that such indexes show only the trend of the phenomenon⁴⁵³; moreover that only by comparing Greece with other countries would be a motivation for Greece to be improved⁴⁵⁴.

It is interesting that NGOs regard also that citizens overdraw about the problem, thus creating a negative image of their country⁴⁵⁵. There are honest and dishonest people as in every country; there are 'two Greeces'⁴⁵⁶. However according to them, in developed countries corruption emerges only in elites (grand corruption)⁴⁵⁷ (e.g. USA – Enron; Germany – Flick; GB – 'cash for honours inquiry'). Bribery is used by corporations for the promotion of investments in underdeveloped and developing countries⁴⁵⁸. In Greece petty corruption is expanded⁴⁵⁹. This form is visible and has negative consequences for citizens' morals and education⁴⁶⁰.

Another difference is law enforcement and punishment. In Greece 'big scandals' are either rarely cleared or the offenders are rarely punished, mainly if they are politicians⁴⁶¹. They note politicians' impotence to be a model of behaviour for the citizens, especially when they do not

⁴⁴⁵ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 181; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODES 91, 35, 23; P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 168.

⁴⁴⁶ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODES 58, 60.

⁴⁴⁷ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODES 109, 119.

⁴⁴⁸ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 269, 267.

⁴⁴⁹ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 257.

⁴⁵⁰ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 260, 266, 268.

⁴⁵¹ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 78.

⁴⁵² P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 121.

⁴⁵³ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 122.

⁴⁵⁴ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 139; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 33, 52.

⁴⁵⁵ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODES 32, 12, 14.

⁴⁵⁶ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI : CODES 48, 13, 55.

⁴⁵⁷ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 128.

⁴⁵⁸ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 98; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 158.

⁴⁵⁹ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODES 97, 137.

⁴⁶⁰ P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 78; P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 84, 88, 93, 94, 96, 97.

⁴⁶¹ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 179, 248.



acquit and do not be punished (top-down approach: ‘*corruption begins from the top*’)⁴⁶². Our interviewees emphasize and put the blame on politicians, omitting the responsibility of economy’s representatives involved in such cases. Consequently, ordinary people view corruption as a normal behaviour to achieve their goals⁴⁶³. In our question how comes that although Greeks view corruption as normal, criticise and condemn it in international public opinion and European research (Halman 2001, WVS 2000)⁴⁶⁴, no justification could be given. The Greek State reacts by issuing more laws, severe punishment and increase of bureaucratisation, which citizens try to avoid.

Apart from individualism⁴⁶⁵ and State’s distrust, our interviewees criticise tolerance and clemency as a national attitude having historical, socio-cultural origins⁴⁶⁶ which pertains not only to corruption but also to whatever law violation⁴⁶⁷. In addition distrust and disrespect in state’s control mechanisms, such as police, are the result of strong disapproval from the left political parties in Greece, especially the young generation, after the last dictatorship⁴⁶⁸. Thus in turn was followed by police indifference in keeping public order and protecting citizens⁴⁶⁹. The appraisal did not affect only the police, but had side effects on core national institutions such as education system, church and religion, distortion of symbols and history etc⁴⁷⁰. Under the trend of the last decade, the respect of national institutions and symbols was regarded as non political correct and characterised as racism, fascism and churchy behaviour⁴⁷¹. After all, according to this view corruption is higher-more extended-than in the past, yet mainly superficial. According to the second view, corruption always existed and the rates remain more or less the same⁴⁷². It’s not new, legislation reforms and new institutions (e.g. GIPA, Ombudsman)⁴⁷³ are signs of serious efforts and progress which still do not reflect upon country’s scores.

Concerning mass media, the interviewees criticise strongly the legal status of private mass media, mainly because it does not provide enough check and balances as in other developed countries (for example USA), in order media’s power be moderated⁴⁷⁴. The presentation of political and social issues becomes a commodity and is commercialized; the same applies for

⁴⁶² P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 1, 182; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 85.

⁴⁶³ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODES 15, 16, 18, 125, 77, 127.

⁴⁶⁴ Halman, L. (2001). *The European Values Study: A Third Wave. Source book of the 1999/2000 European Values Study surveys*. Tilburg: EVS WORC Tilburg University (http://spitswww.uvt.nl/web/fsw/evs/documents/Publications/Sourcebook/EVS_SourceBook.pdf); World Values Survey/WVS (1999-2004), *Online Data Analysis, Greece 1999*, [GR_WVS 2000] 01-03-1999-30-06-1999 (<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>).

⁴⁶⁵ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 85.

⁴⁶⁶ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 67; P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 31, 32.

⁴⁶⁷ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 47, 103, 118, 74, 135, 136.

⁴⁶⁸ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 27, 28.

⁴⁶⁹ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 27, 28.

⁴⁷⁰ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 258-263, 83.

⁴⁷¹ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 75-77.

⁴⁷² P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 21.

⁴⁷³ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 78, 73.

⁴⁷⁴ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 67.



corruption⁴⁷⁵. Their presentation is either superficial and descriptive⁴⁷⁶ or scandal-mongering, and since real journalism is very expensive, 'TV news changed to shows'⁴⁷⁷.

There are two views about the power of media in Greece. According to the first, they are not considered so powerful, but equally responsible for corruption generation to society⁴⁷⁸. According to the second one the media use their power to manipulate public opinion, politicians and politics in general, for their own good⁴⁷⁹.

After all, NGOs do not seem to have a clear view whether mass media's interests collude with political ones⁴⁸⁰. Still, all interviewees accepted that they fail to inform citizens objectively; they rather distort information or semi-inform, confusing the public⁴⁸¹. Therefore, their role for informing and sensitizing about corruption⁴⁸², as well as other issues, such as policing, public order etc.⁴⁸³ is questioned. This contradicts with the demand, of the interviewees to be supported in their work and in anti-corruption campaigns by the mass media⁴⁸⁴.

The status of NGOs is also questioned in respect to their financing and integrity. Some representatives admit that several NGOs are manipulated either by the governments since they are strongly depending on state funds and parties⁴⁸⁵ or private enterprises and various economical and political interests outside the country⁴⁸⁶. On the contrary, some other interviewees a) reject the political submission since the members of NGOs are not coming just from political parties, but also from various social and professional groups⁴⁸⁷, and b) accept that NGOs may be financially supported by large corporations or the governments⁴⁸⁸, yet they are not controlled by them⁴⁸⁹.

On account of the measures that Greece should take in order to diminish corruption, representatives of NGOs stress the role of the State, European Union (EU) and NGOs. According to them administrative reform and cultural-ideological 'reform' in society is absolutely necessary⁴⁹⁰.

⁴⁷⁵ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 33, 43, 45, 54.

⁴⁷⁶ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 64.

⁴⁷⁷ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 20.

⁴⁷⁸ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 27, 29, 31.

⁴⁷⁹ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 50.

⁴⁸⁰ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 52.

⁴⁸¹ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 48, 85, 87, 89, 90.

⁴⁸² P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODES 90-93, 141.

⁴⁸³ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 31, 32.

⁴⁸⁴ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 223, 37, 55.

⁴⁸⁵ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 140-143, 146, 148.

⁴⁸⁶ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 155-159, 166, 167.

⁴⁸⁷ P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 136.

⁴⁸⁸ P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 121.

⁴⁸⁹ P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 133.

⁴⁹⁰ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 48.



In detail, concerning the State and Public Administration, this reform constitutes:

- Better regulation, administrative and regulatory reform and public consultation in law making procedures⁴⁹¹.
- Better management of the public sector, improvement of education⁴⁹², performance measurement to raise efficiency⁴⁹³ and introduction of Conduct Codes for all public officers (civil servants, governments, deputies)⁴⁹⁴.
- Modernization of justice⁴⁹⁵.
- Computerization of public administration and use of new technologies⁴⁹⁶.
- Witnesses' protection for those denouncing corruption incidents⁴⁹⁷.
- Strict law enforcement⁴⁹⁸.
- Better policing⁴⁹⁹.
- Design of an (realistic) immigration policy, control of immigration, quotas of immigrants that the country can accept, like the rest developed countries, USA etc. and integration of immigrants in national society and economy⁵⁰⁰ with serious efforts for their assimilation.
- Support of healthy competition⁵⁰¹ and integration of paraeconomy in official economic transactions (institution of Observatories to control illegal financial activity⁵⁰², system for lawful tax exemptions⁵⁰³).
- Change of voting system in order to decrease candidates' dependency from powerful economic interests⁵⁰⁴. A less proportional voting system with many small districts can result in a powerful government, for introducing reforms⁵⁰⁵.

The interviewees question whether there is a political will from the government to confront corruption and be engaged in reforms⁵⁰⁶. They accentuate civil society's duties to improve its own life, not waiting for politicians⁵⁰⁷. In globalization where things move quickly and problems expand, the state and democratic system fail to react on time⁵⁰⁸. Thus, NGOs and

⁴⁹¹ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 205, 208.

⁴⁹² P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 129.

⁴⁹³ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 40.

⁴⁹⁴ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 206.

⁴⁹⁵ P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODES 174, 177.

⁴⁹⁶ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 210.

⁴⁹⁷ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 209.

⁴⁹⁸ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 61.

⁴⁹⁹ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 80, 81.

⁵⁰⁰ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 236-238, 251, 252.

⁵⁰¹ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 177, 185, 186.

⁵⁰² P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 190.

⁵⁰³ P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 11, 12.

⁵⁰⁴ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 66.

⁵⁰⁵ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 210, 211, 221, 223.

⁵⁰⁶ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 21 ; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODES 61, 62; P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 149-151, 154.

⁵⁰⁷ P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODES 57, 59, 105, 171, 173.

⁵⁰⁸ P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODES 108, 109.



economy representatives should be incorporated in the governance system⁵⁰⁹ and social pacts should be formed⁵¹⁰. Our interviewees note that economy is getting interested in social issues as firms nowadays work in a corporate model⁵¹¹.

The interviewees highly appreciate international efforts against corruption because each state is ineffective to fight the problem by itself⁵¹² *'the state is too small for big problems and too big for small problems'* (!)⁵¹³. Most of the interviewees recognise that EU played a significant role for Greece's development⁵¹⁴ generally and in respect to confront corruption. After all, Greece⁵¹⁵ can use good practices of other developed countries, even if this will take time⁵¹⁶. Moreover, although EU criticizes Greece for corruption, EU itself suffers from the problem, as well as from de-legitimization and extensive bureaucracy⁵¹⁷; an interviewee noted as well that the co-existence of two law orders –national and European constitution– may result in law insecurity, which eventually will produce such problems as corruption⁵¹⁸.

Our interviewees of the present target group, as the rest of the groups, recognise the role of education⁵¹⁹ and socialization process⁵²⁰, in which parents, teachers, university teachers and intellectuals should be engaged⁵²¹. Especially in Greece the alleged modernization of the educational and pedagogic system destroyed national culture and symbols and resulted in declining moral⁵²².

NGOs reserve for themselves two roles concerning corruption: a) informing and sensitizing citizens⁵²³, b) motivating and/or pressing governments to take measures against corruption, enforce law and comply with EU and international conventions⁵²⁴. The main difficulties they note for their work are their limited influence because they have short history in Greece, along with their limited resources (staff and budget)⁵²⁵. In addition, neither governments nor mass media pay any special attention to them⁵²⁶, eventually because of their consensual profile⁵²⁷. However, here we must mention that the work of two out of three NGOs we interviewed,

⁵⁰⁹ P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODES 110, 112.

⁵¹⁰ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 200.

⁵¹¹ P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODES 112, 119.

⁵¹² P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 116.

⁵¹³ P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 120.

⁵¹⁴ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 117.

⁵¹⁵ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODE 58; P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 9.

⁵¹⁶ P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODES 161, 163.

⁵¹⁷ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 71, 98.

⁵¹⁸ P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 99-107.

⁵¹⁹ P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 4.

⁵²⁰ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 52; P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 68.

⁵²¹ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 187-189.

⁵²² P9 TG NGOs_D21_CHL: CODES 258, 259.

⁵²³ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 197-199.

⁵²⁴ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 194-196.

⁵²⁵ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 218, 219, 221, 222; P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 62.

⁵²⁶ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 17, 216.

⁵²⁷ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 101.



have not any special production in order to require attention. Moreover, one of these two in spite of its low production has gained eventually much more publicity it is worth, because of international and governmental support.

Summing up most of the interviewees are optimists⁵²⁸ about corruption control and its decrease in the long run. It is worth mentioning that one of them sees a positive function in everyday corrupt practices, otherwise –according to him– its total suppression⁵²⁹ could outcome in blocking economy (‘lubricant’)⁵³⁰. In any case our interviewees agree that fighting corruption is a long process related to the modernization of society⁵³¹, for which are needed education, consensus and cooperation of the whole socio-political and economical system⁵³². Four out of six of our interviewees in the present target group, are either businessmen or executives. This can eventually explain why their discourse and arguments can be irritating to which group they belong: an interviewee yet stated that ‘the best state is no state’⁵³³. Their approach is based on personal experience, rich information and many stories, which due to their social status can be promoted as reliable, valid, and admitting no doubt. An elaborated view of the civil society, its role and limits, apart from general declarations is missing, eventually because as mentioned in the beginning, NGOs are new constructions in Greece.

4.7. TG VI ECONOMY

4.7.1. General Comments

The approach of TG Economy to corruption is interesting, although it lacks a special theoretical background, apart from the general context of neoliberalism; it illustrates the relationships between private and public sector with several examples. TG economy includes two representatives of enterprises (Hellenic Bank Association – EET and Hellenic Federation of Enterprises – SEV) and one representative from the employees (General Confederation of Workers of Greece – GSEE).

4.7.2. Evaluation Units

P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE
P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA
P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE

⁵²⁸ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 119.

⁵²⁹ P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 72.

⁵³⁰ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 72.

⁵³¹ P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 75; P13 TG NGOs free_ex_TI: CODE 76; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 170.

⁵³² P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 186; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 106.

⁵³³ P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 255.



4.7.3. Interviews' Analysis

First of all in respect to corruption the representatives of economy seem not to having a clear idea about the meaning of the term. Coercion of citizens and enterprises' abuse to correspond to illegal demands of public servants, police included its characteristics and forms. They associate corruption with illegal economic transactions;⁵³⁴ however it does not always involve financial exchange but also coercion⁵³⁵. As substitute to grand corruption they use: scandals⁵³⁶, opacity⁵³⁷, pathogen (see: disease)⁵³⁸ and merging of interests⁵³⁹, while for petty corruption: gift – bribery – pour boire⁵⁴⁰, use of means (use of political acquaintance, identity or preference)⁵⁴¹. All representatives distinguish between these two kinds of corruption: grand and petty corruption. The representative of employees notes that the term is very *elastic*⁵⁴² thus; its true meaning is concealed⁵⁴³. He thinks that corruption is a very 'heavy' term for everyday corruption and corresponds only to grand corruption⁵⁴⁴.

For the target group, corruption is a *process*, as well as a form of *behaviour*⁵⁴⁵. As a process, it refers to acquiring income beyond the legal context or the official economic network (outside the formal financial and state structures – see *paraeconomy*)⁵⁴⁶. As behaviour, corruption means the positive attitudes of people to acquire income through illegal means and methods⁵⁴⁷. A person is considered as 'corrupt' either if he/she offers a bribe or if accepts a gift⁵⁴⁸. Therefore, positive attitudes, tolerance and involvement in illegal practices are regarded as corruption.

The interviewees accept⁵⁴⁹ that corrupt methods are often not with the purpose to violate the law, but to speed up a request and a right to which the people are entitled⁵⁵⁰. Yet, it seems that then confuse corruption with economic crime and market manipulation⁵⁵¹, namely fraud⁵⁵², tax evasion⁵⁵³, market abuse and manipulation⁵⁵⁴, deceitful bank loans⁵⁵⁵, crime in

⁵³⁴ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 51, 118.

⁵³⁵ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 117-119; P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 48.

⁵³⁶ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 20, 21.

⁵³⁷ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 5.

⁵³⁸ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 19.

⁵³⁹ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 5.

⁵⁴⁰ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 46.

⁵⁴¹ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 203.

⁵⁴² P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 71.

⁵⁴³ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 65.

⁵⁴⁴ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 4, 8.

⁵⁴⁵ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 54.

⁵⁴⁶ Paraeconomy is the officially non-active but really active economy (otherwise *grey economy*), Kanellopoulos, K. (1990). "The paraeconomy in Greece: what the official data show", Discussion papers, No.4, KEPE, Athens.

⁵⁴⁷ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODES 55, 56.

⁵⁴⁸ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 69, 70.

⁵⁴⁹ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 61.

⁵⁵⁰ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 34.

⁵⁵¹ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 92, 59.

⁵⁵² P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 58.



electronic transactions (e-crime)⁵⁵⁶, money laundering⁵⁵⁷, unfair competition⁵⁵⁸, extortion⁵⁵⁹, smuggling and evasion of social insurance payments⁵⁶⁰, as well as with issues such as paraeconomy⁵⁶¹ and illegal wealth⁵⁶². However, during the interviews, some of the above law violations are not characterized as corruption but as market manipulation, rent seeking⁵⁶³, formation of cartels etc⁵⁶⁴. It is worth mentioning that from all the previous law violations, the issue of paraeconomy along with its size is one of the most controversial issues in Greece. In general, representatives of economy do not attribute any positive effects to corrupt and illegal practices⁵⁶⁵. They stress that *corruption is against economic development*, increase of investments⁵⁶⁶, economic integration (in terms of micro and macro - economy) of the European Union⁵⁶⁷, modern state⁵⁶⁸, competitive market⁵⁶⁹, because (indirect) costs in financial transactions⁵⁷⁰. Although they dispute corruption's positive effects as a mechanism of income re-allocation⁵⁷¹, they finally accept that paraeconomy is the (hidden) 'engine' of country's economy, accounted for the so-called '*Greek Miracle*'⁵⁷². It creates extra (not official) income for the population to improve its life, which otherwise could not be justified by their low wages.

Furthermore, they accept the moralizing element⁵⁷³ of corruption; still they are reluctant to deal with it, eventually because they don't feel safe in such soft issues⁵⁷⁴. According to them ethical and moral interpretations⁵⁷⁵ are not useful for the confrontation with corruption⁵⁷⁶. It is obvious that interviewees follow a pragmatic approach to whatever issue based on hard facts. Nonetheless, the representative of Employees' Confederation expresses occasionally social and ethical concerns about corruption from a different point of view in relation to the other

⁵⁵³ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 57.

⁵⁵⁴ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODES 95, 96.

⁵⁵⁵ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 85.

⁵⁵⁶ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 121,122.

⁵⁵⁷ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 63.

⁵⁵⁸ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 68.

⁵⁵⁹ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 243.

⁵⁶⁰ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 70.

⁵⁶¹ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 247; P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 153.

⁵⁶² P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 242.

⁵⁶³ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 50.

⁵⁶⁴ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 235-237.

⁵⁶⁵ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 44; P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 121,122.

⁵⁶⁶ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 6.

⁵⁶⁷ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODES 1, 6, 8.

⁵⁶⁸ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 4.

⁵⁶⁹ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 113.

⁵⁷⁰ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 10.

⁵⁷¹ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODES 154, 155.

⁵⁷² P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 245-249.

⁵⁷³ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 62.

⁵⁷⁴ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 60.

⁵⁷⁵ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 87.

⁵⁷⁶ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 85.



two members of the target group. He describes corruption as: *the commercialization of democratic values*⁵⁷⁷, *the dominance of firms' profit over human capital wages and interests*⁵⁷⁸, *the 'black' illegal work, employment of not insured workers*⁵⁷⁹. He notes that the essence of corruption consists in that citizens cannot have the rights and benefits they are entitled to through institutional – official – meritocratic processes, but have to use unofficial processes or their party political vote⁵⁸⁰.

Although corruption is seen mainly as an illegal financial transaction, the interviewees focus on the public sector⁵⁸¹, and the interface between public and private sector⁵⁸². According to them the dominant problem is in urban planning departments, tax offices⁵⁸³, licensing in general⁵⁸⁴ and public procurement⁵⁸⁵. Offering an accepting bribe⁵⁸⁶ is not considered an issue of 'bad morals'⁵⁸⁷, much more a result of low wages in public services⁵⁸⁸, and outcome of a system reproducing mutual reliance because of serious shortcomings⁵⁸⁹, such as:

a) Bureaucratic, time consuming and complicated processes.⁵⁹⁰

b) Overregulation: non transparent regulatory process⁵⁹¹, often laws change⁵⁹² (e.g. taxation)⁵⁹³ resulting in complicated legislation⁵⁹⁴ and lack of legislative consolidation⁵⁹⁵. Yet, they underline that legislation is sufficient and in its content satisfactory. The problem according to them is pinpointed, without further explanation, in law enforcement⁵⁹⁶. Often law changes result in law ignorance and in relation with law ambiguities (grey areas) offer to the public servants free interpretation of regulations and enormous discretion power⁵⁹⁷.

⁵⁷⁷ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 74.

⁵⁷⁸ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 82.

⁵⁷⁹ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 257.

⁵⁸⁰ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 205.

⁵⁸¹ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 8.

⁵⁸² P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 232,238-249.

⁵⁸³ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 12; P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 40.

⁵⁸⁴ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 124.

⁵⁸⁵ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 234.

⁵⁸⁶ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 28; P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 129.

⁵⁸⁷ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 23.

⁵⁸⁸ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 94.

⁵⁸⁹ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 63, 86.

⁵⁹⁰ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 8, 18, 19.

⁵⁹¹ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 9, 13.

⁵⁹² P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 12.

⁵⁹³ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 13.

⁵⁹⁴ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 9.

⁵⁹⁵ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 11.

⁵⁹⁶ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 20.

⁵⁹⁷ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 14; P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 11; P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 76.

c) Insufficient computerization⁵⁹⁸.

The interviewees confirm in general that there is corruption in politics, yet they are two different views on the issue. One considers corruption beginning from bottom to the top; low ranking public servants constitute ‘very wide basis’ of the state pyramid, which is difficult to be controlled⁵⁹⁹. Thus the interviewees say that they do not have any experience of illegal activities with high ranking officials of State Institutions (e.g. Capital Market Committee, Bank of Greece, Ministries⁶⁰⁰). Low ranking officials and law class citizens, although they are not corrupt, are more prone to law violations as they ‘do not have nothing to loose’⁶⁰¹. The second approach considers public servants as ‘*little poor devils*’⁶⁰², while the real problem is ‘grand’ corruption, which emerges in political and economical elites and their common interests (‘games’)⁶⁰³.

According to the interviewees, the political system is rotten and corruption is inherent, and this because mass media enterprises and other private corporations are the main backers of political parties and politicians⁶⁰⁴. The relevant legislation for candidates’ party financing is described as inadequate and inefficient as well as only for effect⁶⁰⁵. Consequently, corruption begins *from top to the bottom*, since politicians give the negative example to public servants to succumb to corrupt exchanges⁶⁰⁶.

Summing up, the interviewees consider state operating against free competition and efficiency an ‘unsuccessful’ entrepreneur and public sector with its major shortcomings – inefficient controls, discontinuity of management, big size – to be significant factors for corruption⁶⁰⁷. They don’t dispute that economic ‘law violations’ may take place in private sector⁶⁰⁸, as is the case of stock exchange market and stockbrokers companies⁶⁰⁹, or small family enterprises mistreating employees and using illegal labour force⁶¹⁰, but according to them, such cases are rare and related either to low moral standards of people⁶¹¹ or insufficient internal controls of the enterprises⁶¹². Whenever small enterprises follow corrupt practices, it is because they have to operate with the state’s bureaucracy and public services⁶¹³ and they do not have enough resources (money, specialized personnel such as lawyers, accountant etc.) to face delays⁶¹⁴.

⁵⁹⁸ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 22, 15.

⁵⁹⁹ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 55-57.

⁶⁰⁰ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODES 72, 73, 103, 94.

⁶⁰¹ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODES 160-163.

⁶⁰² P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 75.

⁶⁰³ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 72, 73, 77.

⁶⁰⁴ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 41, 44, 45.

⁶⁰⁵ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 42.

⁶⁰⁶ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 307.

⁶⁰⁷ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODES 80-83; P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 99, 101, 95.

⁶⁰⁸ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 110.

⁶⁰⁹ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 93.

⁶¹⁰ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 266, 268.

⁶¹¹ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 109.

⁶¹² P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODES 97, 98.

⁶¹³ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 112.

⁶¹⁴ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 16, 17.



The same could also counter the citizens, which some interviewees are rather unwilling to accept⁶¹⁵. The interviewees underline that, both small and big enterprises do not approve corruption because it costs and affects them, yet in different ways. For small enterprises the cost is direct loss of money (pay bribe, pay fine)⁶¹⁶, while big enterprises, such as corporations with shares traded in stock markets, companies trading brand name products, jeopardize their *good will*, reputation (*intangible assets*) and clientele. The damage – for example the loss of good will if linked to a (corruption) scandal – is indirect, intangible, realized in the long run and more difficult to be reversed, and may even result in bankruptcy⁶¹⁷. Therefore, private sector does not have any motive or interest to be involved in activities⁶¹⁸. Corrupt attitudes are not related to the size of an enterprise but to the seriousness and integrity of doing business⁶¹⁹. Capitalism and free market have principles and values, such as respect of free competition, which counter with corruption⁶²⁰.

The representative of employees has a different opinion; corruption is present in economy and private sector⁶²¹. Businessmen advance corruption (paraeconomy and illegal labour force⁶²²) using every mean for maximization of their profit⁶²³. Greek economy is not structured on a sound basis (achievement of competitive advantage though innovation and quality), but promotes labour cost squeezing⁶²⁴ and depends on public procurement and privatizations⁶²⁵. All in all, he describes corruption as a *vicious cycle* nourishing itself: it starts from merging of interests among elites (political system, economy, mass media⁶²⁶) and spreads through out the public sector and society (top-bottom approach)⁶²⁷. His examples are very well documented and convincing, not using vague principles and ideals.

The representatives of economy also confirm what is known as *globalization of corruption*; enterprises from developed countries use illegal practices to expand in developing or under-developed countries⁶²⁸. Greek firms face corruption when investing abroad⁶²⁹.

An issue discussed with our group was the low ranking of the country. Some representatives accept the low position of Greece in international *corruption indexes*⁶³⁰. Indexes depict that

⁶¹⁵ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODES 23-27, 125, 127.

⁶¹⁶ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 35.

⁶¹⁷ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 36, 38, 42; P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 84.

⁶¹⁸ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 98.

⁶¹⁹ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 71.

⁶²⁰ P2 EET_HBA TG ECONOMY: CODES 88, 159.

⁶²¹ P1 GSEE_TG ECONOMY: CODE 241.

⁶²² P1 GSEE_TG ECONOMY: CODE 260.

⁶²³ P1 GSEE_TG ECONOMY: CODE 264.

⁶²⁴ P1 GSEE_TG ECONOMY: CODE 260.

⁶²⁵ P1 GSEE_TG ECONOMY: CODES 264, 35-37.

⁶²⁶ P1 GSEE_TG ECONOMY: CODES 33, 34, 39, 40.

⁶²⁷ P1 GSEE_TG ECONOMY: CODES 19, 41, 179.

⁶²⁸ P1 GSEE_TG ECONOMY: CODES 195-197.

⁶²⁹ P2 EET_HBA TG ECONOMY: CODE 69.

⁶³⁰ P3 SEV_HFE_TG ECONOMY: CODE 3.



the higher the degree of development of a country, the lower is the corruption⁶³¹. Scandals and corruption are present in all countries, having various forms and intensity⁶³². In developed countries, corruption incidents are sporadic and take place only in high levels of state or private enterprises⁶³³. On the contrary, in Greece corruption is present in everyday life (petty corruption)⁶³⁴. Yet, some representatives question strongly the validity and reliability of these indexes; they question modelling and measuring everything, especially complex social phenomena such as corruption, because they can be manipulated in order to be standardised⁶³⁵. They contest the high levels of corruption attributed to Greece by the ranking of international organizations⁶³⁶, showing the country in worse position than undeveloped countries of Africa⁶³⁷. After all, the representatives of economy are optimistic⁶³⁸ that corruption can be controlled and corruption in Greece is decreasing⁶³⁹. This is due to some good anti – corruption practices acclaimed internationally (OECD), such as on money laundering⁶⁴⁰. They regard the whole discussion in Greece as a communication game of the politicians⁶⁴¹ and a self-fulfilling prophecy for the citizens⁶⁴², making harm to themselves⁶⁴³. The role of media in this show is significant. Anticorruption campaigns, under the motto of ‘*catharsis*’ in the sense of no tolerance, clearance of cases, and punishment were used as a major communication issue with dubious upshots during the last two pre-electoral debates and as a joker between political rivals⁶⁴⁴ as noted also in the first research phase. The interviewees reject the slogan of New Democracy and of Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis for ‘*Zero tolerance to corruption*’⁶⁴⁵ for his re-election and such crusades. According to the interviewees mass media acclaim for themselves not just the role to inform⁶⁴⁶, but also of the role of an ‘alleged external controller’⁶⁴⁷, for the real purposes of which the interviewees show strong reservations⁶⁴⁸. Increase of circulation and the number of viewers is for them the obvious reason⁶⁴⁹ for such overstatements existing everywhere⁶⁵⁰, while the exercise of pressure from the media over the politicians in order to acquire what they want⁶⁵¹, is the

⁶³¹ P3 SEV_HFE_TG ECONOMY: CODE 24.

⁶³² P3 SEV_HFE_TG ECONOMY: CODE 25.

⁶³³ P3 SEV_HFE_TG ECONOMY: CODE 27.

⁶³⁴ P3 SEV_HFE_TG ECONOMY: CODE 26; P2 EET_HBA TG ECONOMY: CODES 150, 136.

⁶³⁵ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 185, 187, 188, 98.

⁶³⁶ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 81.

⁶³⁷ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 97, 192, 194; P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 138.

⁶³⁸ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 43.

⁶³⁹ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 24; P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 120.

⁶⁴⁰ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 133, 136.

⁶⁴¹ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 14, 18.

⁶⁴² P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 14.

⁶⁴³ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 104, 110.

⁶⁴⁴ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 22, 23, 133, 136, 111-116.

⁶⁴⁵ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 100-102.

⁶⁴⁶ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 58, 59.

⁶⁴⁷ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 62.

⁶⁴⁸ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 60.

⁶⁴⁹ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 61, 63; P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 113.

⁶⁵⁰ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 64.

⁶⁵¹ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 206, 209.



undercover reason (cf. Law 3592/2007 ‘Concentration in media ownership and licence of mass media enterprises and other regulations’ about cross-ownership of mass media and antimonopoly public policy, described as a law ‘à la carte’). ‘TV – democracy’ is in fact very elusive and mass media are described as the ‘nursery of corruption’⁶⁵². One interviewee said that even enterprises are the victims of ‘mass media’s tyranny’ (e.g. presentation of banks as unreliable)⁶⁵³. About NGOs’ discourse on the issue, some interviewees regard them as being manipulated either by political parties⁶⁵⁴ or by the State since they finance a lot of them⁶⁵⁵, thus whatever conclusions from them are rejected as untrustworthy.

Overall, the interviewees strongly reject that Greeks are more corrupt than other people of other countries. Although the interviewees avoid justifying corruption on morals, occasionally they attribute corruption to personal characteristics⁶⁵⁶ and situations, especially concerning charges against corrupt practices⁶⁵⁷.

Nonetheless, they recognize the turbulent history of the new Greek state resulted in citizens low trust and structural shortcomings in respect to other countries such as: transparency in political parties’ financing⁶⁵⁸, independency of Regulatory and Administrative Authorities⁶⁵⁹, clearance of scandals⁶⁶⁰, dispensation of justice in publicly known cases, control-assessment of financial reports of governmental and political organizations (state, political parties, NGOs)⁶⁶¹.

Especially the representative of employees emphasizes on Justice’ submission to government, claiming that judges act like Pontius Pilatus (cf. TG Justice: ‘hot potato’)⁶⁶².

In general, the interviewees consider that the *over-presentation of corruption* in mass media and its use by politicians, establish the view to the citizens that corruption is a *vicious cycle*, existing everywhere and this in turn cultivates apathy, indifference and acceptance⁶⁶³. The selectivity of justice in favour of organized group interests and especially of political elites, masks corruption⁶⁶⁴ and causes feelings of inequity. They interviewees criticize the tolerance of the citizens in everyday law violations (i.e. car traffic) and their low punitiveness. Moreover they don’t reckon Greeks to be ‘convinced capitalists’, but ‘adventurers’⁶⁶⁵ (i.e. massive investment in stock market, 1998)⁶⁶⁶.

⁶⁵² P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 161, 173, 133, 136, 174, 175.

⁶⁵³ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODES 115, 117.

⁶⁵⁴ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 24, 25, 183, 184.

⁶⁵⁵ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODE 217.

⁶⁵⁶ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 103, 104, 90, 92.

⁶⁵⁷ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 128.

⁶⁵⁸ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 47, 48.

⁶⁵⁹ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES:49, 57.

⁶⁶⁰ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 121, 123.

⁶⁶¹ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 222, 224.

⁶⁶² P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 137, 139, 141, 154, 160.

⁶⁶³ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 177, 179.

⁶⁶⁴ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 180, 181.

⁶⁶⁵ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODES 29, 32, 33.

⁶⁶⁶ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 29.



Coming to the measures against corruption, interviewees recognize the role of political system in confronting corruption as important but not catalytic⁶⁶⁷. Political desideratum is significant, but political system has proved inefficient and reluctant to take serious measures against the problem⁶⁶⁸. Governments are either too weak to confront with strong interests linked to corruption or unwilling, thus their initiatives are only for attracting attention in order to be re-elected⁶⁶⁹. What is missing in Greece is not only or not so much control structures, control culture and realistic policies, but persons in whatever area with vision, skills and character, 'like the judges in Italy who confronted with mafia'⁶⁷⁰. The above view ascertains economy's beliefs more in personal initiative and capability, than in political and state intervention. According to the interviewees, privatization, reduction of the state size and state intervention are the keys for fighting corruption⁶⁷¹; regulatory reform of telecommunication market and privatization of state banks are used as examples of sound improvements⁶⁷². All the above express economy's view that corruption is *a problem of the public sector*. In detail, regulatory and administrative reform consists of:

- a) Better regulation⁶⁷³, computerization (e-government) administrative (computerization, simplification) and regulatory reform⁶⁷⁴, law implementation⁶⁷⁵.
- b) Performance-measurement in all public services. Support of independent authorities⁶⁷⁶.
- c) Modernization of justice⁶⁷⁷.
- d) Motives and policies for integrating paraeconomy in the official economy (e.g. tax or payments reduction), in order that enterprises accept to official register their activities and refuse illegal labour⁶⁷⁸.
- e) Information and education of the citizens ('stakeholders'), especially the young generation⁶⁷⁹.

Concerning NGO only the representative of employees expresses a clear view. Although he questions integrity of NGOs (especially in relation to their funding), he accepts that NGOs can play a positive role and support the education and information of the citizens in areas, where it is difficult for the State, on the condition that there is accountability for their financing and field of work⁶⁸⁰.

⁶⁶⁷ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 12.

⁶⁶⁸ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODES 17, 18; P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 10, 11, 124, 125.

⁶⁶⁹ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODES 35, 38.

⁶⁷⁰ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODES 179, 184, 14.

⁶⁷¹ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 123, 107, 108.

⁶⁷² P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 97; P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 87.

⁶⁷³ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 10.

⁶⁷⁴ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 21.

⁶⁷⁵ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 86.

⁶⁷⁶ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 51, 52.

⁶⁷⁷ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 53, 54.

⁶⁷⁸ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 250-256.

⁶⁷⁹ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 84; P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 167.

⁶⁸⁰ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 218-221.



European Union (EU) counts as having a significant role⁶⁸¹, especially with regulations about common market, free competition (e.g. Markets and Financial Instruments Directive, Investment Services Directive)⁶⁸², as well as with systems of control⁶⁸³. However, the representative of employees questions effectiveness of EU's initiatives to fight corruption. EU is also an organization dealing with money and power distribution. It promotes initiatives having rather symbolic character, in order to stabilize citizens' trust to itself, as well as activating moral elements to win their acceptance⁶⁸⁴. Yet they accept that Greeks should not 'reinvent the wheel', and several measures can be used under the condition that are adjusted to the normative and social context of the country, and should not be copy-cat, as a 'misfit costume'⁶⁸⁵.

In contemporary economy where corporate governance of enterprises and business ethics seem to prevail, enterprises have shown to be interested not only in profit making, but also in social issues such as corruption⁶⁸⁶, at least verbally. The role they reserve for themselves is self-regulation, citizens', and specialists' information (justice personnel). Our interviewees expressed their rejection to corrupt practices not only as federation representatives but also as persons, noting that they do not want to live in a country where corruption exists⁶⁸⁷. Their argumentation is not based on moral standards, although they refer to business ethics⁶⁸⁸, but on measurable costs and outcomes which corruption has for economy and society.

5. Comparative Analysis

POLITICS

In general the language of the interviewees is not sentimental, aggressive, severe, denunciatory or demagogic, as it was in the documents of the first research period. However, there are occasionally some dramatic and exaggerated expressions, some other mind-blowing. Moralistic rhetoric is present in both periods.

The approach of Communist Party differs from the other parties, as it was in the first period. Corruption in both periods is closely related to economic structure of the modern western democracies, namely the functions of the global capitalist system, while for Greece it views corruption relating to the socio-economic and political structure, development and history.

Synaspismos shares several viewpoints of KKE, such as corruption in Greece is related to the socio-economic and political structure, as well as the broader meaning of corruption, which associates with social inequalities and injustice. All the previous were not evident in the first period.

⁶⁸¹ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 81.

⁶⁸² P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 84.

⁶⁸³ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 85.

⁶⁸⁴ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 88-96.

⁶⁸⁵ P1 TG ECONOMY_GSEE: CODES 210, 211-215.

⁶⁸⁶ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODE 39.

⁶⁸⁷ P2 TG ECONOMY_EET_HBA: CODE 149.

⁶⁸⁸ P3 TG ECONOMY_SEV_HFE: CODES 74, 66.



The term corruption was widely used without clarification and analysis in the first period. In the second it is also used much extended, because it has been established in the political rhetoric as a means of communication with the public and as a kicker. But since in the interviews the politicians were asked to define it further, they had to and each party member used the term in different ways.

In the second period the reasons and causes are mainly attributed to overregulation, complexity of legislation, low citizens' resistance and institutional crisis. In the first period corruption is either accounted for as a contemporary phenomenon or directly related to parliamentary practice in modern times and public administration. In the second phase is also stressed the lack of computerization and new technologies in the public services. In the second period public administration is presented to be rather a victim of party politics and working conditions.

Although we cannot say that citizens' responsibility was totally missing in the first period, in the present phase there is special account to it. In both periods the target group consider that in order to fight corruption 'organized efforts' and radical changes and needed.

In first scientific period there was a general credit to control. In this phase the focus was on regulatory and administrative reform, simplification and of legislation and recasting, law enforcement, education of citizens and modernisation of public administration (computerization, new technologies).

Although political system is criticized, all MPs deny characterizing the whole political system as 'corrupt', and defend of honesty and legal behaviour in politics, the same as in the first period.

Criticism on EU bureaucracy for nourishing corruption, inability to confront it and stigmatizing came up in this research phase, apart from the Communist Party; still its support is strongly approved by most of the politicians. The idea of 'zero tolerance' to corrupt behaviour at the individual level is less supported in this period, but was not absent, than in the first⁶⁸⁹. Corruption control (anti-corruption crusade) was still in the main agenda of both big political parties during the elections of 2000 as well as of 2004, but not in the last September 2007, especially by the governmental party. While in the previous elections it was overstated and dramatised, in the last one was rationalised and adjusted to certain policies by PASOK and downplayed, referred to previous governments by ND (governmental party). 'Catharsis', was used too as a major communication issue with dubious outcomes during the last two pre-electoral debates and as a joker between political rivals.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The General Inspector of Public Administration adopts in many points a more critical approach to corruption in public services than the representatives of the public administration of the first phase. This seems normal firstly because he is independent, he has large authority and can express his views more freely. Secondly, the institutional role of the General

⁶⁸⁹ TG Politics Parliamentary Proceedings 11.06.2005, p. 15; 22.11.2005, p. 60; 13.04.2006, pp.12, 49).



Inspector, as controller of the whole area of public services, provides him with an overall view on the issue in comparison with his senior colleagues of the first phase.

The above-mentioned difference is more obvious in respect to the definition of corruption. In the first phase, the texts of the high ranking civil servants who participated – the Inspectors Controllers Body of Public Administration, the General Inspector of Public Administration included, and others – referred to corruption as a given term, without any further comments on bribery, breach of trust or duty etc., associating it with misgovernance.

The General Inspector, in the second phase, accepts the definition of corruption of the World Bank and relates it to some of its derivatives (opacity, synchronizing of interests etc.). Somehow his approach to the issue of corruption is closer to the views of Civil Servants' Union (ADEDY) of the first phase who shares a more elaborated and critical view and emphasized on party-politics.

In any case, the texts of the Public Administration analysed in the first phase, as well as General Inspector's interview in the second phase correspond to the causes of corruption (bureaucracy, inefficient control mechanisms, overregulation, party-politics, etc.) and to practices in confronting with the problem in public administration. However in both phases these measures are rather declaratory (statements) than elaborated and thought out.

JUSTICE

In the first phase the language of the texts was strictly legal, especially the decision of the courts as it should be. They (First instance court and the Court of Appeal) choose all those references and statements of the plaintiffs that could support their mutual accusations in order to construct their deductive reasoning and draw their decision.

Prosecutors' findings in both cases describe the background of the cases, the main points of the parts' and the witnesses' testimonies, as well as the evidence-material they submitted. At the end of the text are the prosecutor's conclusions with their justifications.

In the second phase the discussion is open and loose to all relevant issues.

In the first phase the prosecutor's findings of the second case-study (illegal naturalizations) use an emotionally loaded rhetoric, expressing strong concerns among others over the 'impeded risks for the national interests'.

In the second phase the interviewees refer to the issue with rational arguments corresponding to their personal view without exaggerations.

In the second phase, corruption is discussed and analyzed as social issue: the interviewees tried to define its causes, extent, forms and the best practices to fight it, which in the first phase pertained to law shortcomings and services' inefficiency.

In the first phase the term 'corruption' is not used at all in the first case study. It appears only once in the prosecutor's findings of the second case study ('occasional cases of corruption by attachés should not be ignored'), without further explication; the term is regarded as a given. Nonetheless, scorn for the 'corrupt' (?) situation is implicated in the whole text of the findings.



In the second phase, all the interviewees try to define the term and its forms. They consider it to be very broad and can be used only for the communication. They refer basically to the crimes included in the chapter of Criminal Law concerning duties and service. In the second phase all the interviewees admit that ‘corruption’ in its core is economical.

In the first phase the responsibility for ‘corruption’ is highly credited to the politics and political system. In the second phase the causes of ‘corruption’ are not only attributed to the party-politics, but also to economical interests, overregulation and its side effects, legislation ambiguities, unprofessional attitudes of the public servants, as well as to low citizen’s resistance, low aesthetics, low education and rotten civilization.

Unlike the first phase they disapprove heavy sentences and severe punishment against corruption, but recommend education, information and cultivation of people and efficient control. In the first phase more legislation and tough control was implicit in the texts.

In the second phase it is strongly supported that ‘corruption’ is not only a Greek phenomenon but a global one. Moreover, the interviewees reckon corruption in Greece not (at least not much) higher than other developed European countries; according to them, mass media overstate for reasons of impression and sensation and eventually at managing political system for their own economic interests. In the texts of the first research period was not paid any particular notice to this.

Another issue that was not come up to the first phase was that ‘corruption’ has no positive effects, because it results in unequal treatment and law insecurity.

POLICE

In general, it is difficult to compare between the first and the second phase police discourse on corruption. The reason is that during the first phase there was only one news video from a local TV-station referring to the break up of an illegal naturalization network by the local police as primary document and the statements of the police officer in charge.

On the contrary, a better comparison can be made between the general documents of the first phase (reports of the Division of Internal Affairs of the Hellenic Police/ DEY) and their interviews at the second phase. At the same time, the representatives of the DEY as well as of the Police officers’ Union (PFPS) believe that corruption in the Hellenic Police is not an issue of concern, especially in comparison to rest of Public Administration: a point several times come up in the reports of the first phase.

In respect to the degree of social acceptance of the Hellenic Police today the representative of the union considers it extremely low. Opposite to him, DEY’s interviewees, as well as its reports analysed in the first phase, refer to Police as having high acceptance by the Greek citizens. This seems compatible with European (ESS1-2002, November 2003; cf. EU ICS 2005, pp. 80-81, Figures 3.8, 3.9)⁶⁹⁰ and Greek research (*Ta Nea*, 10 October 2002, pp. 24–

⁶⁹⁰ According to the results of the European Social Survey, the average public satisfaction with the police was among the highest in European countries (6.4; England 6.1; Holland 5.8 – EKKE/NCSR 2003: 17).



25)⁶⁹¹. Furthermore, in both phases the politicians and public administration are considered to (re-)produce high corruption, described with particular ‘dark colours’. Finally, in our analysed texts at both phases the policy measures focus on prevention and education and not on higher sentences and strong control.

MEDIA

Comparing media’s discourse in the first with that in the second phase we note more differences than similarities. Media in the first phase refer to specific cases, the case studies included, either for scandalization or exercising a demolishing critique against the country and only occasionally to the general issue. Sharp criticism was taken place especially after the publication of European and international reports. Consequently their presentation of corruption as a social illness is justified.

The interviewees approach the issue less from its commercial, scandalous point of view and more from its socio-political. Corruption is not regarded as social illness but as a social phenomenon formed in historical process and defined by the culture of the country, which is also associated with the development of political systems and economical interests. Thus the acceptance of the international organizations’ rankings form the media in the first phase is explained. On the contrary, the interviewees in the second phase are very sceptical about CPI’s indexing and the position of Greece.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that apart from the extreme criticism of the Media to the political system, public administration with all its problems and dysfunctions has a special place in their appraisal.

EKKE/NCRS (National Centre for Social Research) (2003). *Greece – Europe. Society-Politics-Values* (Results of the first Round of the *European Social Survey*)

(URL: www.ekke.gr/ess/ess_results.doc) (in Greek). EKKE is the participating Greek organisation in the Survey.

Different results has the European Crime and Safety Survey/EU ICS (2005), pp. 80-81, Figure 3.8: Percentages of the public thinking police are doing a good job controlling crime in their area in 2005 and results from earlier surveys, and Figure 3.9: Country ratings on EU ICS-based Police Performance Index for 2005, with historical data for some countries. The figure shows scores of countries on this EUICS-based index of police performance and comparing with historical ICVS data.

Performance Index is least favourable for Greece and three other countries of the total 18.

European Crime and Safety Survey/EU ICS (2005). *The Burden of Crime in the EU. Research Report: A Comparative Analysis of the European Crime and Safety Survey*. Gallup Europe et al. (<http://www.europeansafetyobservatory.eu/>).

⁶⁹¹ According to another survey, the police rise to the third place of public acceptance in Greece after the Church, which is put first (77.8%), followed by the European Union (66.8%). Source: *Ta Nea*, 10 October 2002, pp. 24–25. *Ta Nea* (The News) is a Greek daily newspaper of high circulation. A public opinion research company carries out monthly on behalf of the newspaper a research called “Political Barometer”. The above results refer to the Research Period 11-28 September 2001 (9/2001, 31) and a sample of 1,659 persons over 18 y.o. from the general population; see more details at URL: www.v-prc.gr/4/11/1_gr.html and www.v-prc.gr/2/polvar31/index_gr.html. See also de Waard, J. (1999). “The Private security industry in international perspective”, in: *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* 7(2): 143-174.



NGOS

Comparing to the first phase's results, NGOs have a less emotional approach to corruption as social issue. Although their discourse is more rational and coincides with the views of the target group-economy, they still account it a social illness.

Our interviewees show special interest in petty corruption, which was not explicitly referred to in the first phase. Attention is also given to the negative upshots of police corruption on public order, when discussing illegal naturalizations by one interviewee of the same NGO. It is repeated that this form of corruption puts the state's core in danger, being captured by outlaw networks, as well as social cohesion.

Grand corruption was not an issue of special attention in the discourse of NGOs in the first phase, apart from illegal naturalizations (2nd case study) and this only by one organization. In the present phase it is limited to party financing and transparency in electoral expenses, illegal or extra-legal exchanges between politicians and private sector, mainly mass media enterprises. What it is new in this phase is that NGOs refer to the role of economy and mass media. Their view coincide with that of economy's group about the negative effects of corruption on free competition and business ethics; it is interesting that they justify (small) enterprises' illegal practices as being unavoidable to bypass bureaucracy. NGOs view the commercialization of the News as the main reason for scandalizing and overpresentation of the problem.

Similar to the first research phase, NGOs regard corruption, leading to poverty and under-development and reject having whatever positive upshot. About anti-corruption policies, NGOs underscore as in the first period the involvement of the civil society and the cooperation with EU countries. Furthermore in this phase, the interviewees point to citizens' education, sensitization and the role NGOs can play.

They note NGOs' low influence on society and politics due to their short history, limited resources (staff and budget) and the low interest of mass media to promote their work because of their consensual profile. Moreover, it is acknowledged that there are NGOs serving either governmental or private sector interests that fund them. The main difficulties they note for their work are their limited influence because they have short history in Greece, along with their limited resources (staff and budget).

Summing up, NGOs seem, like the first phase, very concerned about corruption and were willing to discuss about it. Their discourse and view seem still to be rather simplistic, as we noted in the first research period. Their argumentation is a medley of other target groups' views, especially these of economy. Overall, NGOs in Greece are newly founded constructions and eventually need some time to make up an original view on social problems such as corruption.

ECONOMY

Representatives of employers (credit institutes and enterprises) composed 2/3 of our group and of employees 1/3. Economy in Greece only recently interested and get involved in corruption and transparency topics. The first sub-group strongly disapproves of corrupt



practices as it undermines free competition and competitiveness. Interviewees maintain that enterprises – especially large corporations – are against such practices because they jeopardize their fame and good will. Paraeconomy, tax and insurance invasion do not correspond to prevailing business ethics.

Likewise to the first phase, the state is heavily criticized of being bureaucratic, thus corrupt methods were justified as a means to bypass bureaucracy and legislation shortcomings (overregulation, lack of legislative consolidation), though rejected. This subgroup follows a bottom-up approach by maintaining that petty corruption is widespread in the country and grand corruption is restricted exclusively to party financing and the analysis is superficial and short.

Nonetheless, the union of employees has the opposite view (top-bottom). Private sector is criticized so much as the state for using and reproducing corrupt practices, since most Greek companies are not competitive, but rely on public procurements. Political corruption is explained by collusion of politics and private interests (media and other enterprises).

In the second phase, all interviewees refer to Media and NGOs' role on corruption. They have a very positive attitude towards NGOs, especially their role to inform and mobilize citizens, while for the media the interviewees question their integrity and objectivity in general, and the special issues.

On account of the measures against corruption, the group stresses, as in the first phase, the role of education. The representatives of Greek industries and Banks put also emphasis on regulatory and administrative reform in order bureaucracy and overregulation to be reduced ('less state is better').

Summing up, in the present phase our interviewees focus less on morals and more on economic reasoning; corruption harms economic development and investments, impairs economic integration, modernity, competitive market and economy, causing (indirect) costs in financial transactions.

6. Conclusions

Summing up the essential findings of this research period, all interviewees agree that corruption is expanded in Greek society, but when they had to define the areas they refer to the public administration, afterwards they specify certain services where is (big) money (*'where is money, is also corruption'*), and later on every target group accentuates that not all public sector is corrupt, not all people are corrupt, and not our group is corrupt, not the people we know are engaged in illegal activities. The transparency of parties' operation is seen the most serious issue, while the role of private economical interests is not bypassed.

Concerning the definition of the term corruption, it exists a vague dissent about its content, some admit it is general, very general and although useful for communication not for dispensation of justice, and cannot not to include grand corruption. When they have to specify the activities, those that have better knowledge of law they refer to criminal law and to coercion as a necessary element to distinguish the practices which have to be regarded as corrupt and must be punished.



The causes are attributed to consumerism, greed, low education, erosion of civilization, increase in tolerance towards law violations, collapse of values, low quality of politicians, failing models and missing strong personalities in the public life, state's discredit, overregulation, law ambiguities, often law changes (no one came up to law ignorance), private interests, political capture and reliance on economic interests, the distorted development of the Greek economy and the political dependence of the new Greek state, increased after 2nd World War and the civil war, thus our turbulent past and the residues of ottoman occupation. The term causes in general to those not being jurists confusion, placing economic crime, tax evasion, share leaks etc., even fraud and thefts in corruption area.

In general, the approaches about the causes of corruption follow two lines with some variations each one.

- a) An individualistic-ethicist approach: Corruption reflects low morals, low quality of a person;
- b) an individualistic-economist approach: Corruption is product of (free will) rational choice, after the calculation of costs and benefits of the respective practices and their consequences;
- c) a socio-political approach: Corruption is product and side effect of distorted economic and political development;
- d) a polito-economical approach: Corruption is product and reflection of an unavoidable stage of capitalist evolution and a stable characteristic of latecomer countries, such as Greece, to the capitalist mode of production;
- e) a socio-legal approach: Corruption is attributed to overregulation, low quality of legislation, reproduction of a compromise's culture between politics and several organised and powerful interest groups, as well as the serving of small party-political expediciencies, which discredited state institutions and eroded social morals.

The historical dimension exists more or less in all views, but in the first two raw, unrefined and standardised. No groups apart from economy and NGOs accepted that corruption in Greece is higher, or at least much higher, than in other developed European countries. The European and international research findings with the CPIs reflect, according to them trends, which are not particular reliable, eventually serving some not always clear purposes. Yet, the measurement is not denied or rejected, but it is stressed that more research is needed with the use of other instruments.

The EU's support in confronting corruption is appreciated and its role is considered positive for the country, in spite of criticism about its corruption and its heavy bureaucracy. An issue which seemed to occupy a significant place in the discourse is the declining role of EU as a prototype for the country's improvement and citizens' education due to its big enlargement. This reflects a hidden worry (a kind of pessimism), which was not verbally expressed, for not existing any longer a model, an example to which we have to attain, irrespective that all stated to be hopeful about the future. The above pessimistic feelings can be associated with the references that the Greek state is not appreciated any more by the citizens, because of the party politics and populism used by the political system in Greece, which encourages and tolerates corruption and arbitrariness. The optimism was justified with arguments about the better education, the exhaustion of population's tolerance to such practices, the increasing resentment and signs of population's reaction. But no answer could be given how notwithstanding the improvement of education, as they acknowledged corruption increased as themselves noted.



In general, all target groups stress the need for reforms at legislative and/or economic level, as well as the improvement of quality of public administration. Furthermore that anti-corruption legislation is more than enough what is missing is political will/desideratum for reforms and transparency.

Concerning anti-corruption policies, the majority of the target groups and the interviewees reject repressive methods and severe punishment and give emphasis on the strengthening of prevention with improvement of education, information, sensitization, mobilization and awareness of the citizens and control of private mass media, in particular the electronic ones. They regard as necessary the upgrading of political life with better in the sense of qualified, educated and scrupulous politicians, the emancipation of politics and their release from economic interests, the reform of electoral law (voting system), more efficient and (occasionally less) control mechanisms and effective law enforcement.

The sense of culture although was often used remained obscure; it was related still with the economic development of the country and of politics, the influence of various internal powerful groups and external power centres, the party politics of the governments which disables meritocracy and erodes social conscience, leading to dispute of the institutions. Such examples are the often law changes, the inadequate law enforcement, the vaporous meaning of laws, some contradictions in the content of law, and occasionally the submission of justice to politics.

Where, the target groups showed inability for concrete suggestions are the private media and the means for influencing them to improve the quality of their discourse and role. All agree about their detrimental effects, the confusion and disillusionment they create to the population and the failing of serious quality journalistic discourse and the reproduction of it by politicians and in reverse.

The discourse of the majority of the target groups was positive, constructive and not nihilistic as in economy and interviewees of NGOs. However, elements of the national identity and culture, such as the insubordinate character of the Greek population and even clemency in justice, having its roots in antiquity in the writings of Aristoteles and continued in the writings of the Fathers of the Orthodox church consisting in the *clemency principle* (aequitas) in contemporary law, such as in administrative law, in criminal procedure law (in dubio pro reo), in civil law etc., were rarely approached in a positive way. The interviewees also hyperbolise about several situations to the disadvantage of Greece, comparing them with the other countries, either due to lack of or false information, which we had the opportunity to check it occasionally (i.e. TG Politics).

Finally, it is acknowledged that corruption in modern Greece must be eliminated, because it is incompatible with democratic values and economic growth; zero tolerance, although referred randomly, is a slippery concept and an empty rhetoric. It represents a set of ideas and symbols and a distinctive policy 'style', rather than a concrete set of interventions (Newburn & Jones 2007)⁶⁹² and has not been accepted by the majority of the interviewees⁶⁹³.

⁶⁹² Newburn, T & Jones, T. (2007). Policy Transfer and Criminal Justice, Maidenhead: Open University Press.

⁶⁹³ cf. TG Politics Parliamentary Proceedings 11.06.2005, p. 15; 22.11.2005, p. 60; 13.04.2006, pp.12, 49.